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Abstnct
The spri::ad ofdemocracy around the world in the eighties and nineties has given
rise to a new industry of development. known as political or democratic developmenl
Inlemational organizations. aid agencies, public institutes and private consultants have
increasingly tumcd to the support of elections, political parties. civil society and
legislatures. Their work is conducted through technical1material programmes. skills
transfers. and conceplual training and education. Academic interest has in tum expanded
beyond traditional questions ofdemocratic transition and consolidation to consider this
new field of democratic developmenl. but the literature remains limited.
This thesis is an examination of that literature. specifically regarding legislative
srrenl:,'thening in new democracies. The review is enhanced by my practical experience
managing political development programmes in transitional legislatures in a number of
countries. but focusing specifically on Yemen and Morocco.
In my experience. legislative development does not adequately consider the
academic literature. The work is conducted withoul proper study or reflC(;tion. The
literature is itsclfinsufficient. but is growing. Nonetheless the work is done despite this
gap in knowledge, and is further debilitated by a poor grasp on the intemal politics and
prospC(;ts for democratization in a given country. The conclusion of this thesis is that
legislative development, having successfully entrenched itselfas a form ofdeveJopment
aid, must now go the next step and 'educale' itself to ensure success in achieving its
ambitious objectives. In closing, I make particular 'policy' recommendations in this
respect.
The length of time belween the slart and finish of this thesis by force lengthens Ihe lisl of
those instrumental in seeing ils completion.
Dr. David Close has been an inspirntion from my undeq,'T3duate days, and was
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Helen Oliver was departmental secretary for much of my programme. and was a source of
laughter and friendship, not to mention administrative support. Thank you to Ruby
Banfield as well, who has been with the department of late. for her invaluable assistance
in guiding me through the last year and days of my programme.
The list of friends and family who encouraged. exhorted, prayed and threatened is too
long 10 list here. but several merit special mention: Penny Dobbin. without whose
prompling I mighl not have returned the first phone call from NDI. and thereby would
have missed the whole adventure: friends and students ofMUN Christian Fellowship,
who alternatively prayed or puzzled over my studies: the Robertsons. who fed me food,
material and spirilual: and Jim Hawkes, MP for Calgary West (1979-[993), who hired me
for my firsl parliamenlary job in Oltawa. and brought to life a dream to work in
parliament. Thanks also 10 friends at Calvary Baplist for much cncouragemenl. and to
Andrea. for prayers and believing in me.
The staffat the Nalional Democratic Institute for International Affairs became family for
a number of years. and their expression ofconfidence in sending me to Madagascar in the
firsl place, and all subsequenl missions. humbles me still. I acknowledge in particular
NDI Presidenl Ken Wallack and Middle EasllNorth Africa Director Leslie Campbell.
There are so many others. including Andreas. Julie. Deborah. Jean. Kim. and Ahmed.
Rebecca. [ have kept your words. Criticisms of aspects of my experience contained in this
thesis are no refleclion on the Instilule or my experience, but rather counsels for 'going
the nexlstep.'
Lastly, I thank my brother and sister for much love, and my parents, one who gave me a
love of books, the olher a love of people: both gifts make this work possible.
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Dedication
This thesis is dedicated 10 Sandra. a child labourer in Guatemala who I have met- along
with her family. on each of my visits to that counlry. Democralic government, and the
legislatures that feature in them. is ultimalely for the children. To that I add the people of
Yemen. Everyone should visit a Shangri-la; one exisls in Arabia Felix.
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Chapter 1 Introduction, NDI O\"C~rviell'
With the end of the Cold War in the 1980s. American foreign policy has in part
returned to the high goals of Wilsonism. in tum giving rise 10 the developmenl ofa
democracy promotion componcnl of internationalism,l That in tum has spumed the
funding of a number of organizations and agencies working to support democracy abroad,
The US Agency for Inlemational Development. the United States Information Agency.
the Stale Department itsell: and a number ofagencics such as Ihe National Endo\.\ment
for Democracy have lent their support to thedevelopmenl ofan entire field. ifnot
induslry. of democracy assistance.:
These efforts include both practical institutional support to parliaments. political
parties and elecloral systems. as well as support to ·social forces' within civil society.
The work is ambilious. It is bolh high·minded and practical. It also flows from US self-
interest.;
This thesis is an examination of one componenl of democracy assistance:
ISee Mich.ael Co.\. ··Wilsonism Rnurgenl? The Clinton Administr.llionand the Promotion of
Democracy:' .4mf!ricul1 Dl!mrxr(J()" PromO/lOll: Impulses. Srru/f!gies and fmpaas editors Michael Co.\. G.
John IkenberT)' and Takashi (O.\ford: Oxford Universily I'res§. 10(0). Also Thomas Carothers• ..Hdinfl
DemrxraQ· .4broad: The Lf!urning Cun'e (Wa.shington: Carnegie Endo\\menl for International Peace.
Im).ppA-5.
lEnc Bjomlllnd. "Democracy 111<: .... The Wi/SOIl Quarter(I", 15.3 (Summer 1OOt). p. 2. URL:
hnp:/lwww.wwics.si.edLL1olltrt.acWwqIWQSElECTIBJOURN.hun.
JEdward Ne\\man. ··Ocmocracy Assistance: MOlives. Impacts. and Limilalions." Ethnic Crmj1i<;/
Research Digest..\, 1 (September 1001 l, pp.l-..\. URL: hnpJ!w\\w.incore.ulst.ac.uklecrd/ne"man.hunl. See
also -Agency Objeclivn~al URL: hnpJiwww.llS.lid.gov!democrac>·/dgso.html.
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legislative development. It considers the academic literature on legislatures in general.
and particularly the question of the role of legislatures in democratic development. It also
provides a critique of the aid based on that literature, and my e~perience abroad. It
concludes that legislati..·e development could be enhanced by a better understanding of
the literature on the role of legislatures in both senses noted above. Legislative
development would also benefit from the incorporation of a more systematic approach in
the planning and execution of legislative assistance.
My interest in this topic is both academic and professional. I worked in both
chambers ofCanada's parliament for a number of years. before undertaking graduate
studies on democratization in Latin America where I also traveled to observe Guatemala's
ongoing transition to democracy. I later worked in Africa and the Middle East in the field
of democracy assistance with the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs.
one of the pre-eminent democracy assistance practitioners. This thesis is therefore based
on both my experiences and my studies. but was prompted in particular by my work
abroad. Without my experience. this thesis could not have been done. The questions I
raise would not have occurn..d to me. and I would have undoubtedly read the literature in
adifferenl way.
This approach explains the somewhat unorthodo~ ordering of the chapters thaI
follow. (have profiled the institute I worked for as part of my introduction in this chapter.
In chapter 2 I providl.' skl.'tches of the two countries which serve as case studies - Yemen
and Morocco - including their respective legislatures. Chapter 3 is a recounting of my
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experience in these countries. and is followed in chapler -l by a critical assessment of the
literature surrounding legislatures and legislative development. My conclusions and
recommendations are contained in chapter 5.
Thomas Carothers. a promincnt author on related questions. also worked in
democratic development and published \\idely on its strengths and weaknesses. Like him.
I have adopted a qualitative methodology. rather than a quantitative onc: Carothers·s
experience is of course more broad. his academic qualifications more extensive. and his
work more thorough. My thesis is a much simpler retlection on my work in democracy
assistance in two lransitionallegislatures. considered through the lens ofa more limited
critlcal review of the Jiterature.
Additionally. Carothers considers the results of the aid programmes.1 My effort
has been to look at more immediate questions. such as the contexts in which my two
programmes were executed. and whether or not the assistance given was in fact grounded
on an~1hing approaching a proper assessment of where ·we· could have impacl.
The thesis concludes Ihat the field of legislative development could be aided by
more careful reflection in three ditTerenl aspects ofthc work: systematic study. core
strategy and assessment. That is. the work could be aided by a more careful study of the
countries chosen as candidates for democracy work. Secondly. a core slralegy influenced
~Thomas CarotheB. Assessing Dl!mrxraC).· Assistance: The Case ofRomani" (Washington. DC:
Carnegie Endo",menl for International Peace. (996). p. 6.
'lbid.p.7.
by the American model and concept of democracy is restricth'e. Finally. programme
assessment (before. during and after programme completion. including of the tegi~latures
themselves) is fundamental to successful democracy assistance. but it is not yet done
adequately. I examine these issues in the literature review.
Uhimatcly. the inadequacies of legislative development are in large measure a
eon~quence of the lack of study and assessment by both practitioners and academics.
The work of practitioners is based on a forward-operational focus and lacks adequate
assessment and study. which undermines it. The work of academics has focused on
questions ofdemocratic transitions and consolidalions. but not on democratic
de\'e!opment aid. In my concluding chapter. I make sewral recommendations concerning
the practice of legislative democracy assistance. as confinned in the literature. This thesis
remains. of course. a limited analysis. There is much more to study. but legislatures do
not get much anemion. either their role in transitions or the impact of legislative
development aid on them. What I have attempted to do. however. is simply to consider
the academic literature that does exist. and draw attention to what might be missing from
it and from the practice of legislative aid.
Poorly conceived and designed legislative programmes \\i1l have a counter-effect.
The donor community will determine that legislative aid does not work. whereas all that
might be said - ifsuch assistance is really not working. is that poor(v conceiw!d or
executed legislative development programmes do not work. Inasmuch as legislative
development programmes are grounded on an incomplete understanding of the politics of
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the countries in which they are conducted. of the transitions underway. of the role and
history of the legislatures in which they arc conducted. of the centrality and capacity of
those legislatures in new dcmocracies. they arc handicapped from the beginning.
That has been the case with the [nstitUlc'S progrommes in Morocco. and to a much
lesser extent. in Yemen. In the words ofNDI's fonner vice-president.
··hopcfully....writers...will one day soon examine the ways in .....hich the myriad eiTons to
enhance the role oflegislatures in democratizing countries do or don't actually help:'"
Additionally. lhey \\ill need to consider how lhose effons arc concch·ed. planned and
executed. Democracy assistance is neither inevitable nor futile. 7 But if it is 10
supplement at all. it \\;11 require more thought.
National Democratic Institut~for InterniJtional A/fiJ;n (NDI)
In 1983 an Act of Congress was passed creating the National Endowment for
Democracy (NED) to promote democracy abroad. as a publically funded agency run at
arm's length.' Congressional leaders. supponed by the Reagan Administration. belie\-ed
that supporting democracy around the world was inherently easier and wiser than dealing
with (the aftermath of) authoritarian regimes. The Endowment's broad objecti\'es remain
to promote democracy training programmes and institutions. to aid and strengthen
"'Thomas O. Meli.... Review of LltgiJ{lJliH PoIilk"$ in Ihl! .~r..b World: Ihl! Rl!surg.mce of
fJt>mocratic Institulions b}- Abdo Baaklini. el. al. JUdd/it ErJSl Polity 7. 2 (february 2000). p.5.
ICarothers• .~ssessing DemrJ<:rac:. Assistom-e. p.7.
IDavid Lo\\e. "Idea to Reality: A BriefHiSlOI)' oflhe National Endowmenl fOl' Democracy.-
(Washington. D.C.: National Endo\\ment for Democracy. 2001). URL:
hnp:/IW\\w.ncd.orglaboutlntdhistol)·.hnnJ.
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electoral processes. generally to fosler "cullural values. institutions and organizations of
democr:uic pluralism:" all in keeping with US national imerests and indigenous factors.~
Notably. lhe statute creating lhe NED required it to support American organizations that
would in turn support democracy abroad: hence. the establishment and gro....th of
democratic development was a key objective,lO
This in tum led to the creation of a number of quasi-governmental democratic
development organizations working at ann's-length from the government but relying on
public funds. These funds are provided principally by the United States Agency for
International Development (USAID) in addition to the NED and the US State
Department." The two major political parties in the US set up political party institutes -
the National Democratic Institute for Imernational Affairs (NO!) and the International
Republican Institute (lRIl- dedicated to democratic development abroad. Each has close
ties to but is formally formal independent from its respective pany,l:
The goal of NDI can be summarized as that of strengthening and supporting
IOCarolhers, Aiding DemocraC)' Abroad. pp.30-31. For an assc:ssrmnl oflhe NED. 'lte Rick Tr:lvis.
"The Promotion ofDcrnocracyallhe End oflhe Twentielh Century: A New Poleslal' for American FOI'Cign
Polit~·.- Ajitrlht end: .\foking U.s. Fortign Poliq in Ihe PQSI·CO!J War World. cd. James M. Ston
(Durham: Duke Univcrsit:-· Press. 1998), pp.1S9·l60.
IIBjomlund. HDemocmcy,lnc.Hp.l. Bjomlund pUlslhe figure al USS700 million annually.
~nlingl~.oflheUSajdbudgtt.
I:Carolhcrs. Aiding Dcmocra<}' Ahroad. pp. 31-33. The>' are similar in some ~pct"lS to lhe
Gennan patt}' foundations or sliflungs. such as lhe Friedrich Eben Foundalion and lhe Conmd Adenauer
Foundalion.
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democracy abroad. The Institute works through the pro.... ision of practical political
training, sharing political experiences and providing encouragement for democratic
governance. lJ It focuses on six functional areas: political parties. civic organization,
women's political participation. election processes, governance. and civil-military
relations. Perhaps the term democ:r.lic eduution captures it most succinctly (though as
countries progress in their transitions and move into the consolidation phase, NDl's work
has in tum become more sophisticated and therefore tcctmical).1'
NDr s approach to democratic development work is. the Institute says, unique in
three particularrespccts:
Nor. along with its Republicancounlerpart. is the onlyorganizalion dedicaled
soldyIOpolilicalde,-elopmenlprogrammes(:]
NOI's progmmmes rei)" on volunu:e~",oo donale lheir time and expenise 10
supponlhelnSlilule'shands-onlechnicalassiSlanceprogrammes[:andl
Nor has slructured ilS progr.lmmes 10 ~ multinalional. man;haling the talenls of
(~penpolilil:alpr.tctilione~fromlheL!niledSlalesandaroundlhe\\"Orld."l
NO! work is the more distinguishable by me Institute's focus on political processes.
I~ational Democratic Institule for Inlernational Affairs -About NOI: Mission Stalement,"
(Washinglon. D.C.; Nalional Democralic Institule for Inlernational >\tTaiTS. 2000. URi;
hnp:l/wv.w.ndi.org/about'missionfmission.asp.
I~One example of the increasing sophislil:ation (and the move away from democratic educalion) of
lhe lostitute's ",ort to develop a compuler nern'orK for Slale legislanu-es in South Africa. S« MDemoct1lCy
althe Click ofa Mouse:' XDI Reports: R<!Vi,!"'ofPoJifical D.!l.·l!Iop",em in Xc... Democracies 3 (2001). p.
6. Tr.msilion is used in this lhesis 10 refer 10 regimes undertllking democr.ltil: openingsbUlsliJIsusccpcibIe
10revcrsal;l:onsolidaliongencrallyrcFersloposl·rransiliondcmocrnlicchaliengc-s. slJcll as embedding of
democral:Y·
Il"About NDl; Mission SlalemenL" URL: hnp:/lwww.ndi.orglaboutlmissiOIL'mission.asp.
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programmes and partnerships. As they acknowledge,
[itlisllotagr.mt-makillg.:ntcrprise,butr:nhl:ranopcrationalorprogr:lmmc-
implcmcnting organization. ND1 progr:lmmcs. usually of a technical assis130ce nature,
conc.:ntr:ltconpoliticalprocl:'SSCsandondcl'dopingpannerships-dth':Tonan
indi\idual or institutional basis - wilh those involn'd in the process of dcmncr:ltic refonn
andeonsolidation.'·
The characterization of the well-known Caner Center as an action-fank also applies to
NO!. Execution, not reflection, is inherent to the Institute's approach to democratic
development. '1 This will be examined more in chapter three.
Four key roles generic to the 'international politics ofdemocralization' (IPO)
apply to NOlto different degrees: infraslrueture-builders. resource-providers, technical
advisers, and service-providers. I" As a political foundation. NDI can be seen as one of
among a set of "enablers and agenda sellers who inject resources. empower some actors,
and suppon cenain goals in IPD."'~
The Institule's work on governance (including national legislatures, the topic of
this thesis) promotes representative institutions as crucial to democratic society.:O
16_Aboul Nor: Mission Statement.- URL: hnp:Jlw","w.ndi.org'aboul'mission/mission.asp.
"James M. Scon, ··Transnationalizing [)emOCl11(:Y Promotion: The Role OfWeSlem Political
Foundations and Think·l3IIks,- o.,mo<:ral~(J(io" 6.3 (Autumn 1999), p.IS:!. He (rightly) classifies NDl as
apolilical foundation, much like the Gennan "sliftungs:·
"Scott. -Transnationalizing.•.-.pp.16r·163.
(~rbid,p,I~.
;:(f·'About ND!: Mission Statement,'· URL: hnp:l/www,ndLorg/aboutlmission/mission.asp.
Governance and demOCr:lCy are hardly s}'IIOn}mous. and Carothers says governance wolk is nOl democracy
promotion. BUI, as he adds, there is some overlap. [)emOCTaC)' assiSl3llce practitioners tend to assume good
governance includes democl'1lcy. Those "ho conduct good governance programmes· such as the World
Bankandotherinlernalionalorganiutions.meanbygovernancetheencoUl'1lgingofetTective
adminislriltion. fighting cOrTllption and promoting rule of law. Carothers, Aiding Do-mO(;rllC)" AbrooJ. p.8.
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Effective democratic governance. according to ND!.
...de:pcndson a professional. ae:eounmble.lr.mspan:ntandn:sponsh'e1cgislature. The
nationallc:gislalUn: is the: forum whe:n: lhe: citi~~ns' n:pn:s.:nwti\·¢$ - often affiliat~oJ with
a ....ider.mgeofpa"ies-d~bate:publie:policyissuc:sanoJtl1'lnslalepotieic:sinlola ....s.
Then: are a number of U.S. go\e:mmcnt·funded progr:lmmes desipted to enhance th~
technical capability and infr::lstrue{ure oflcgislaturl:S. NO! progr::lmmes. howncr. arc
unique bcc:ausc lhey focus on poliliC31 organization--lhefOllndationoffunctioning
legislafUn:'S."
In tenns of its approach. NDI responds to requests for assistance in the countries
in which it works. These requests can corne from eilher local partner organizations_
government institutions or personalities (including those within executives or
legislatures). or US government contacts such as embassies and USAID missions.::
Nors work in legislatures includes topics such as legislative procedures.
oversight. executive relations. pany caucuses. and staff functions. It increasingly touches
on technical areas such as bill drafting. legislative research and computet and library
systems. Programmes may also work to increase pubvlic access to a parliament. develop
or enhance constituency relations. or build bridges between legislatures and civil society.
Since its creation in 1984. NDI has conducted such programmes in over thiny countries.:J
The Institute is governed by a Board of Directors. comprised mostly of kading
:1-Abou1 NO]; Mission Stalement:' URL: hnp:!:www.ndi.org/aboul·missionmission.asp.
:~T1te question of how Not am\'cs in a given counll)' is considered bri~l1y in chapter~.
13NDI condu~loo t~gislati\'e programmes in Albania. Alil~ria. Arg~ntin.a. Bangladesh. ~nin.
Brazil. 8ulgaria. 8urundi. Cambodia. C~ntr.lJ African Republic. G«lrgia. Gu}'ana. Hungary. Kazakhstan.
Latvia. Madagascar. Malawi. Morocco. Namibia. Nepal. Nig~r (regional programme ".-ith legislalors from
Benin. Mali. and Burkina Fasoj. Palestine. Poland. Romania. Russia. Slo\'enia. Soulh Afrie;t.. Togo. Ukr.ainc
and Y~men. among Olhe:rs. I worked on the ofthes.:. including ~latlag=r. Togo. Yemen. Benin and
"-lorocco. I also \'isiloo NOI programmes in Soulh Africa. Namibia. Burundi and Palestine as ....ell.
·9·
Democratic Pany personalities. and chaired since early ::!OOI by fonner US Secretary of
State Madeline Albright. Albright served as the Institute"s "ice-president in its early years
before her appointment as US Ambassador 10 the United Nations.:' A president appointed
by the board manages the Institute on a day-to-day basis. in conjunction \\ith the
executive office comprised of a \'ice-president of administration and other senior
management including regional. functional and administrative directors.
The regional directors kad learns of staff from between a halfdozen 10 over a
dozen. These teams write the programme proposals and reports. prepare materials for
programme seminars or trainings. and provide liaison between the Washington
headquaners and field offices abroad. The Institute originally consisted of functional
directors for governance. political panies. elections and civic education. assisted by small
teams ofone or two staff per director to pro\'ide resources and to back stop regional
leams with materials and advice. NDI has of late begun to mO\'e away from this: two
fonner functional directors were replaced with adl"isors. Rounding out NDf sutling arc
human resources. accounting and administrative staff.
While NDI initially sent staff and trainers abroad on short tenn missions. as lhe
work (and the funds to support it) grew. the Institute began to SCI up field offices. There
are now over '"'0 field offices staffed by a combination ofexpatriate and locally hired
statT.
~'Thomas Carolhcn. -Dcmocr.lCl'· Promolion Und~rClinlon:' Thf! JrashinglOn Qu.ulf!r(r. 18. .,j
(Aulurnn 1995). p..:!O. NDI's former presidenl. Brian Alwood. left th<:lnstiIUI<:lo becom~ hC3dofUSAlD
in 1993.
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Finally, the Institute's funding for 2000 was approximately US$JO million.
Approximately 85 percent Oflhis came from USAID (including US State Depanment
funds administered through USAID). Another 10 percent were funds gramed from the
National Endo\\ment for Democracy. An additional four to !i"e percent came from the
UNDP. World Bank. and European donors such as the British Foreign & Commonwealth
OtTice. as well as privare sources.:'
:'Conversation. NDI Staff. Washington, D.C.. November :!OOO
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Chapter Two Country Sketches and Legislali"e Profiles
This chapter provides brief sketches of Yemen and Morocco and profiles of their
respective legislatures. While there are similarilies in the sketches. each country's
respecth'c democratic transition is nonetheless unique. The malerial and time ~riods
covered retlect this. The chapter concludes v.ith profiles of me legislalures of the two
countries.
Yemen
At the risk ofo\·crsimplilication. Yemen's democratic opening and subsequent
(ongoing) transition arc tied almOSI uniquely to one event: the unificalion ofNonh and
Soulh Yemen. 1 Unity pro\'ided thc break with past authorilarian models ofgovcmment.
The choice of democracy also reflected the hopc lhat the new model would help
"legilim:lte and cement the union......: A democratic regime had a beller chance of
withslanding tribal influcnces.) Additional explanations exist. but unily is paramounl.'
I Fora delailed consideratioo ofYemen's unity. see Joseph Kosliner. r..m..n: Torlu(JU!iQue5t/C,.
Unil)"./990·9.... (London:Ro}al [nslilUle for International AlTairs). 1996.
:Abdo Baaklini. Guilain Denoeu.~. and Roben Springoorg.l..-gi.sf<ll;\'I" Pc/Ir;<;s Inlh" .~"<1b "'wld:
Th.. Re5urg..nc.. o/D"moe"<ll;,' InsrirutiolU (Boulder: L}nne Ricnner Publishcrs. 19991. p.~OI.
;Jillian Schl<'edlu. -on Ikmocr.lq-.lnSiitulion,Building. and the Practice of Power in Yemen:'
r"m..n TIm..5. Vol. VlJ.lssue~6. NO"ember 17-23. 1997, pp.l-t URL:
hnp::;...."\\w.y.ncl.}'e. }'emetimes'iss-f6,focUS,htm.
'Oa\'id NaSSOlr, "Evolving: {)emOCr:lCY in Yemen: No Surprise Arrer All:' The t1"u5lringlon R"p<JrI
On Mitkll" Eusr .~jJUi"5 (July/AuguSt lQoCl8). p.~. Nassar ref.:n; tOlh.: th",e factof$as th.: end oflh.: cold
war (wbich removed the dicnl-sl;lIc S1alUS enjoyed by lhe soulh. lhus makin£ unity an «onomie n.:eessiJy).
Unily (whieh Id\ bolh former l'l:'£im~'S 10 conlemplate and ehoose a new regime model). and polilical cultUre
(including lribal groupings which aj!£rcgale inleresls. a"irudes and lobby for " ..sources.. in aoJdition lothc
prol"ision for cons.:nsual formsofdccision-making
-12-
Following unification. Yemen began an ambitious political reform programme, with
cnhanccd press freedoms, competitive political parties. an active civil society, and
eventually, national elections. It was a new and unexpected undertaking in a
neighbourhood not prone to such developments.l The transitional parliament of the
unified Yemen was a combined version of the tWO former national parliaments, headed
by a southerner. Speaker Musupha Yassin No'man. It was made up of the 159 members
from the formernorthem assembly, III from the fanner southern assembly, and 31
newly appointed members drawn from the north and south but in theory tcpresenting
ncither.6 This resulted in a legislature the size of Canada's House of Commons (301
members) for a much smaller country. Clearly. one of the weaknesses of the new state
was the rush to unity. That rush resulted in Ihe failure to clarify thc long.term role of
south Yemen's former rulers in the new Yemen, in light of their much smalkr population.
Compounding the inadequate unity negotiations was the moving oflhe date of unity
ahead by si;( months to head off its critics, thereby worsening an already poorly planned
tnte~'TIltton The poILttcal foundatIOns Simply did no! eXist
~There were dements in municipal and legislative refolTTl5 undenaken in North Yemen in the earl~'
to mid eighties under Presidenl SaJell's kadersllip Illat can be seen. withllindsight. as precUl'SOl'S to
Yemen's democratic opening. Abdo I. Baaklini, Tht! Legal. Political and (nformation Dimensions of
Yt!mt!n's Transition to Dt!mocTo(')" The Role ofthe LegislotuTt!(Albany. NY: Cenler for Legislali"e
Development.1 992).pp.2-3.
6 Saakl ini. The LegiJ/. PoJi/icol and Information Dimensions. p.2. 3. KOSliner says the unilic4
pariiamenillad 320 members: Kostiner. rem..n: The Tortuous Qut!stfor Unif)'. p. 20.
'Kostiner, rem..,,: The Tortuous Qwst!or Unity. p.:!:I. Kosliner explores in more delail the naive
aspiralionsoflheelilesin both s)'slemswllobelieved Illalllleirllig.llllopeswould'carrytlteda}':witlloul
need fordelailed considerations. p3ClS and well-titouglliout plans. pp. 22-35.
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Parliamentary eleetions held in 1993 were lauded by the international community.
but unificalion was quickly followed by disunity. \\'hereas the initial years of unification
were based on a negotiated coalition government belween the !wo fonner ruling panies of
the nonh and south - the General People's COnb'TeSS (GPC) and Yemeni Socialist Pany
(YSP) - this changed with the first elections of unified Yemen in April 1993. The former
northern rulers. the GPC won 122 seats. short of the required lSI seats for a majority
government. The YSP won 59 seats. well shon of its own expectalions. and in third place
behind the lslah • a new northern party composed of Islamic. tribal and business interests
- with its 62 seats. The 1990-1993 GPC-YSP coalition gave way to a tripanite one in
which the blah held more cabinet scats than the YSP. The benefits of unity were quickly
lost on the YSP.
The YSP's failure to negotiate a long-tenn presence in the power structures of the
unified Yemen left it vulnerable to a simple mathematical reality: with a fanner
population base of some 2.4 million in the fonner South Yemen. the party could in no
way expect to fare as well in a unified Yemen with a combined populalion of
approximalely 12 million citizens.H In mid·199·t fighting bet"..een the non-integrated
fonner nonhern and southern regiments began. resulting in a brief civil war. The war
ended a few months later with the fall of the former capital of Aden to the nonhern
forces. and unity was preserved. President Saleh moved to repair the wounds of ....'3I.
*Therisksoftheproposcdelectionslawdo"lItheroad .....ererecogni~edby50me.andthe
predictions came lnIe: the YSP lost sealS in the 1993 elections. Baaklini. The Legal. Political and
Injorma/ian Dimel1SionJ ojY<,lIIen's Transition. p. 9.
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pardoning all who had fought on behalfofthe south. apan from 16 leading YSP leaders
who fled the country!
Constitutional refonns were then passed disbanding the presidential council and
eliminating parliament's power to choose the president from among the council members.
The president would henccfonh be direclly elected in a general election. Thc YSP pany
had its bank accounts frozen. and the pany's assets, including Ihe party's headquaners in
Sana 'a. were seized by the governmenl. lO
Parliamentary elections scheduled for April 1997 were nonetheless held on
schedule. notwithstanding the civil war. The future afthe YSP in Yemeni political life
was complicated by the influence of pany leaders who feared any panicipation would
legitimize the regime. Their leadership lead the pany to boycon the 1997 election. The
GPC won two-thirds of the parliamentary seats in parliament. while the lslah obtained
slightly more than it had in 199). The lackofa YSP voice in parliament impeded the
pany's ancmpt to reintegrate itself into political life following the war. Their absence
9Sal~h';; gesture "'as quil~ magn:lf1imous. and went a long way in easing tensions and ending
residual connict. The 16 c.xikd YSP Ic~ders were tried in absentia. aoothe coun decision rendcred in
1998:5 Icaders received death penahies. 3 recch'ooprisonsentcll(:csoftcnyc:ll$cach.6wcrcgh'cn
suspended sentences and 2. men Were acquined. This "'.15 a long way from treatment gh'co to the accuiiCd in
thc19S6ci,ilwarinsouthYemcn.descri~d3Sabrutale.xerciscinlhesenlingofpolilical,'endcnas.
t"men eounln' Report On Human Rights Practices jor /998 (Washington, DC: Bu~u foc Human Rights,
Democracy and Labour. US State lXpanment. 1999). Re: the brutality of the civil "'ar in South Yemen in
1986. various con"crsations wi1h YSP pan)' members and former residents of Aden now li";ng in 5.lna·J..
1997·1999.
I~DI had limitcd success in lobbying the governmem 10 rc:1c:lSC some YSP monies and party
offices. The govemment argued lhal the YSP considered former S1aiC propenies (and monies) in the south
as party property. which should no", belong to the governmenl ofme unified Yemen. The assets were
seized following the 1994waJ".
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later resulted in the failure of YSP presidential candidate for the 1999 election to be
appro....ed by parliament. II
Tlble%.l
c.......DIocYory~·. Rn:nl Potldc:1I Hiscory llId ~raIic:TrusitioB
Dale Event Significance
1990 Unific:uion of Nonh alll! South Yemen Democratic Mod.:1 adopted
1990- Coalition government ofGPC and YSP. YSP assumJ role in new state dcspite smaller
93 two former ruling panies ofnonh and sizcofsouth YcmcnclcctOr:lte
soutll
Parliamcnlary.:lcction First clections in unificd Yemen. -d.:mocr;uic
c'·ent"·
1993- Tripanitc go'·crnm':llI. YSP marginaliz.:d Unificatiun undmnined as onc pany is
199..; by Islahaftcr 199J dcction results alicnatcd
Scccssionauernpibysoutll.eivilwar YSP n;mowd from govcmmcnt
1994- Cualition Go,·cmmcnl. GPC and Islall YSP funhcr marginalized frum polilicallif.:.
1997 assels sdzed by gO"cmmcnf
1997 Parliamentary- Ekctions YSP boycon. GPS wins (\Oo'(HllitdS of seats
1999 PresidentialElcetion YSPcandio.latefailstoll:cei,·cparliamenlary
approvalforclcction
PrcsidentialEI«1ion
.:!OOO Constitulional Referendum
Satcllwins96!~
Local go"emmcnt law passo:o.I.partiamcntary-
elcctionspOSlponcdandt.:nnsofolTiccstor
MPsandPn:sidente.\lendcd
Election !awfO!Jfinely"iolatcdin
adminisfr.llion.barTingthousanlisof
opposltlon"oteTS
llPresidential candidates arc nominated to parliament. and must obtain l~~ of the vOles of
memben p~ntlo run in me subsequent eleclion. I unsuccessfully argued carl>' on that the YSP sllould run
by~lcctions candidates after tile 1997 oo)·con. to curry favour from parliamentarians in th., hopes ofgelling
their YSP candidate approved in a parliamentary vote, should the YSP panidpa.te in the 1999 presidential
election.
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2003 Parliament:lry Ele<:lionsschctlulcd for ThirdeleC1or.ll'eslin lr.lnsilione~pcrien«,
April
Sources: l"enlt'll: CO/mtry Profile. 1999 (London: The Economist Intelligence Unit. 199Q). URL:
hnp://W\Oow.nu$3.cc.org.'cntl'}"profileslctrpril999/ye.pdf: Abdo Baaklini. T1reLcgal. Political und
'n/armarion Dimensions 0/ Yemen s Transition to Democroc\': The Role ofthe Legislature
(Albany. N.Y.: Centre for LeGisl:!.th'c Development). 19')2 .
Yemeni HOl/sI:! o/Representatives
Yemen's House of Representati\'es is composed of 301 seats. Members were
elc.:ted every 4 years in a first-past-lhe-post, single-member district electoral system.
The legislalure was also unicameral for the period I was in Yemen, despite apparent
agreements berore unification for the establishment of a new second chamber that would
give equality to regions within the unified Yemen. l : Members of Parliament, while
receiving more than the average wage in Yemen, arc poorly paid. They have no personal
staff except for those in leadership positions (speaker and deputy speakers). There is no
provision for per diem covering travel to or from Sana'a for MPs. and MPsdo not have
constituency offices, except for a select few who provide them through their own
resources. The legislature meets throughout the year, with two weeks of silting, followed
by two weeks of recess (the summer month of August and the holy month of Ramadan
are also recess periods).1l
I~The Constitution previously allowed for the eSlablishmenl ofan Advisory Council consisting of
III membcnappoinlcdbythcPresi<knIOftheRepublic.bulilhadnoactuallegislalive role. Such powers
wereaccordcd in a nalional n:fcrendum in February 2001. Its members are srill appoinledbyfhcPrcsident.
The parliamenl pre,iously had a foor year leon. which was e."ended 10 si.\ years in the same referendum.
"Proposed Changes to lhc Constirution.·· Intemet On-line, URL: hltp:il.......w.al-bab.com/yemenlgol·!
amendoo.hlm.
IlBaaklini. The Legal. Political ami I,,/ormotion Dimf!nsions a/remen S Transition 10 Dt!mocrac.)·.
pp.19-20.
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Members possess free mandates. Ihat is, they may cross the floor to join other
panies after election. and their votes can nOI be predetermined by party allegiance. There
are no tenn limilS. and no provisions for recall of members. Dismissal can only occur in
the ease ofjlagrame delicto. or if parliament votes to remove a member's immunily.1'
The parliament is ruled by a presidium consisting ofa speaker and three depuly
speakers. elected by all parliamentarians in a secret vote in the firsl session after a
general election. The presidium is assisted by a Sceretary General appointed by the
speaker. The presidium decides on parliamentary business. orders of Ihe day, and
commillee business. Caucus and committee chairs also panicipate in discussions of
parliamentary business and debate scheduling: in practice, Ihe presidium, led by Sheik
Al-Ahmar. makes most decisions.
I'Baaklini ct. at. Ll'gis/(Jli"e Po/iries in Thl! Arab WarlJ, p. 207.
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T.ble2.1
Ge..... EItcIicNl RauMJ - Scals i. Vr_ HOIlIit ofRrpranlalivn
1990 .........Ity ...rtilI_t I99Jrltctioll '997-
GfC 159{formrrparliamenlofnonh 122 187
Yemen)
VS_ III (former parliamenl of south
"
M'
Yemrn)
"~, 66
"Ot,,, 31: 57) S<'
Tolal 301 301 301
"".
I Thre.: 'indep<;ndcnt' YSP parliamcnt~rianswere also elected, and an: shown here:lS
independenlS. ~ 31 IlCwly appoinled members; alle:!SI 19 were SOtJlhcmcrs. 3 IndL1'endenls
indicale lhose who mainlained indep.:noc'111 SlalUS aller lhe elections. :IS well as smaller panics. In
1997 mOSI independenls soon joined Ihe GPC. bringing Ih.u pany's 100ai 10 22~. Scvcral scalS
rcmaine...tvaeanldueloel«:lion fraud oreanccllalion of local polJingduclovio[ence.Sol.rn:s:
"EI«lion Walch:' JOl/rnul oflkmocrucy. ~,3 (July (993): "Eleclion Walch". Jourtlul of
Demoau<J" 8, 3 (July (997); and B:I:Iklini, Till! l.eg,,!. Political and Informu.lion Dimcmiom of
fcm...n:r Trumition10 lkmrH;raC)·. p.3
There are 19 parliamentary committees. organized along the lines of the
executi ....e branch ministries. As one Yemeni parliamentarian lold me. they represent the
"the kitchen of parliament." where the 'meals' are prepared for plenary debate. II
Meelings are nOI infrequent. and open to the public theoretically but conducted in private
as a practical matter: committee rooms are small and provide inadequate space for other
IIConvemtion wilh memberofparliamcnl., June 1997. By lhisat1alogy he no doubt meanl
committees are lhe heart oflhe parliament. where !he dirty work. is done befOf"C plenary debales. MOSI laws
are in facl prcparedand submitted from lhe eX«Ulivc branch. so Iheanalogy is nOI ahogeIherappropriale
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than the committee members. 16
Committee chairs arc chosen by election in the first committee meeting of each
session. Chainnanships are distributed on a proportional basis reflecting the
composition of parties in the plenary, necessitating some backroom negotiations between
party caucus leaders.l~ Membership on committees is detennined in theory by survey of
members' interests and expertise, In reality. party caucus leaders negotiate assignments
with the presidium. This is then submitted to the plenary session for a vote of approval.
and must be voted en masse
Comminees are comprised of 15 members. Each parliamentarian can serve on
only one committee; as of 1999, 251 of the 301 members were assigned. They can attend
any committee meeting, bUl may only vote in committees of which they are members.
No provision is made for temporary substitution of members, though pennanent
replacements are sometimes made at the discretion of the Presidium. l!
Yemen's commiltees possess a fair range of powers. reflecling the strength of the
parliament in general. Commitlccs may draft legislation but in practice rarely do so
given their lack of means, as well as the lendency ofparliamenlS worldwide to defer to
16Parliamcnt does have a prominent voting board inslalled under a USAID grant. bUI it is now
broken. This is an example ofan excessive and inappropriate 'legislalive development programme' given
the lack ofolher resources in parliament such as lelephones. computers or even photocopiers. The bo:lrd
1'135 ~ommended by an American legislative assessment in 1992. Oaaklini. Tho! l.egal. Pvlifical and
Informalion Dimensioll5 of remen 's Tronsilian. p.):!.
I7E. Derek Butler. remen Huuso! afPeopl.,,; {kpuri.,s: Commill.,es Dir.,ctoraieASUsSmefl/
(Sana'a: National DemOCralic Inslitule for Intemalional Affairs. (997). p.7.
ISlbid.pp.6-7.
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executive branches to perform this function. Draft bills Iherefore originate wilh the
execulive branch. are presented 10 the presidium for 'scheduling.' and then go before Ihe
plenary for debate. They are then assigned to their respective committees by the
presidium. Draft bills may in effect be examined in more than one committee. though
not concurrently. I?
Committees consider draft legislation and sometimes consider additional
research conducted by Ihe comminee clerks. While they invite witnesses from the
ministries relevant to the legislation al hand. or from the public at-large. this prerogative
is not often exercised. and it is not a subpoena power. Committees may consider written
submissions and reports. and the public can also initiate COnlaCI with committees on
relevant matters. The public can even ask to testify. though it is a rare privilege.:u
Committee work is not generally publicized in the press.
Committees can nol amend or modify bills, but can only m3ke recommendations
and proposals which are reported to the plenary session where Ihey are considered and
voted on. After bills have been deb3ted and voted in plenary session. they Me sent to the
president oflhe country for signing.!l With few exceplions (such 3S 3 request on the
part oflhe executive to expedite an urgent bill) all draft bills go through this committee
process. There is also provision for the plen3ry session to revert to what is called in the
Canadian parliament Commiuee of the Whole. In Ihis instance the speaker chairs the
19Butler. HQll$e a/Peoples Dl'pulif!S. pA.
!lllbid.p.S.
!llbid.p.S.
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plenary session. acting as a committee. The decision to deal with a draft bill or matter in
this manner is taken by the Presidium.:!
At present no formal or institutional link exists between parliamentary
commitret!s and their counterpart minislries. Relations are conducted informally through
the clerk, committee chairman or !he presidium. depending on the nature and formality
of the request There is however a minister of legal affairs who is considered the
channel for communications between the parliament and executive branch in general.:J
The parliament is on paper a strong one. and it is certainly more active than
others in the region. II possesses more than adequate powers to fulfill the range of
legislative functions. [t can propose any law, call ministers, and initiate debate on any
subject The government's programme, presented by the prime minisler. must be
approved prior to official installation of cabinet members, The parliament has filII
investigation and inquiry powers, and can set up committees of such as it sees fit, and
empower them to travel around the country.:~
There are few constraints on parliamentary power in Yemen. One is !he provision
for dissolution of the chamber by the president. Such a deeision requires a national
referendum, though this requirement was substantially weakened in the referendum in
!!Butler. Yemen HOl/se off'eopfes Deputies. pA
!>lbid,p.5.
!4Ibid.p,5.
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February 2001.~l The Sttond relates to a limited presidential veto: laws sent to the
president for signing may be returned to parliament, where they can be passed again by a
simple majority vote, though this is rarely done. The third constraint relates to the
budget. Parliament must either approve or reject the budget in its entirety: it can not
amend it.!b A fourth constraint is the absence of apparent sanctions that go with the
ability ofcommittees to summon witnesses or documents. Ihat is, the lack of a subpoena
power of parliament.~7As one analysis suggests, the framing of the powers of the
parliament "indicates a desire on the part of the framers of the Yemeni constitution to
elevate the legislature relative to the prcsidency."~~
In theory this occUlTCd. but its practical effect has bttn limited, A Yemen Times
story appearing in June 1998 testified to the increased activism of parliament. saying that
it was finally standing up for constituents. that the opposition lslah were finally
perfonning their opposition function, and that government caucus MPs .....ere standing up
to their own party in the executive, working more effectively to have their views
considered.'" But ultimately. the parliament possesses limited resources, material and
morale. Staff are organized along political lines and often serve party interests over
l'..proposed Changes to the Constitution:' Internet On-tine, URL: http://www.ai-
oob.coml)"emenlgovl amendOO.htm.
16Baaklini ct. al.. Lt!gislati..., Pulilies in the A'ilb World. pp..! 11·212.
~7Buder, Yemen HouseofPeoplt!$ Deputies. p.S.
'SBaaklinietaI.Lt!gis/otiwPoIiticsin,heArobll'orld.p.2()7.
!~"Visiblc:Gro"'lh in Our Parliament,- remen Timl!$. 8. 27 (June6-12. J9\1aj, p. 2.
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parliamentary ones. and cooperution between parliamentarians and staff is minimal.
Members possess relatively little appreciation of their actual powers. and independent
voices arc controlled by strong party apparatuses.
The speaker and deputy speakers represent the major politicaltcndencics in the
country. aside from the YSP. The spe3ker - a sporadic but reliable ally of the president
and head of the tribal confederacy to which the president belongs· effectively blocks
parliamentary action that might threaten the executive branch when it suits him. Through
his control. the parliament is controlled closely by the executive. Ministers refuse to
3ppear to 3n5Wer questions. even though parliament has the right to call them.}O Laws are
passed by executive decree when parliament is not silting: parliament is supposed to
review such decrees but does not. refusing to challenge the executive on this matter. ll
As Yemeni MPs said following a study tour to the Hungarian parliament. their
biggest challenge is in achieving a measure of rule of law - by which is meant adherence
to parliamentary by-laws and procedures· in their work. Parliament will not be taken
seriously until it takes itselfscriously as an instirution and adheres to its own
procedures. J1
}OBaakllni.et. al. £<'gis/a/ni" Palitics ifl,he Arub worIJ.p. 215.
llBaaklini. el. al. £<'gis/ato'" Politics inlheArob World. p. 208.
l1Conversation with NOI Stall Sana'a Yemen. February 2001. As an e.~ample ofparliamemary
by-laws being surpas$Cd and lhe work ofparliamenl undermined. one deputy speaker argued lhal an
unconstitutional governmenl dulU was preferable to a parliamentary law (and debate) on a revised. military
service law. In October 1997 I nOlW the primary need to bring "'"a measure of'rule of law' 10 the plen.:lf)·
sessions and overall work ofParliament....othenvise...MPs... risk falling victim fO the on:l!estr.l1ions oflhose
in control and their effectiveness in parliamenlary debale. legislative review and ove~iglll is significanlly
weakened:' Butler. Yemen Howe ofPeople's Depulies. p.12.
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Burnell notes that assessments of political change in a particular instance are
either debated by observers or in !Urn remain unclear until the event is over.;' This was
true in Yemen. From 1990 and certainly with the first parliamentary elections in 1993.
Yemen was undettaL:ing a 'new thing.' and made significant progress: ·... \\lthin three
years. Yemen was able to establish the constitutional framework ... within which an
elected legislature could function:·).1 The civil war of 1994 gave rise to caution. but the
country pulled through and a second parliamentary ejection was held in 1997.
Presidential elections followed in late 1999. and th.en the referendum and local
government elections in February 2001.
But suddenly. the democratic bloom wilted. As one government minister told me.
the challenge is to maintain current achievements. let alone advance democracy in the
country.ll When a democratic opening can be said to be stalled or reversing is often only
determined with hindsight. as Burnell suggests. Political development must often be
conducted despite this. Nonetheless. with a clearer assessment ofdemocraey's prospects
early on, much effort might have been saved. certainly in terms of our efforts to assist
theparliamenl.
This was revealed by the national referendum conducted in Yemen in February
2001. In it. the president asked for approval to extend his O\\T1 mandate. Parliament
l)Petcr Burnell. "DemtXracy Assistance: State of the Discourse,~ Dt!mcx:rOQ·.~ssis/(JnCl!:
InleTflUlionafCo-operOlion!or Dt'mocrati:olion Ed. Peler Burnell (Ponland: Frank Casso 2000). p.IO.
HBMkllni. et. al. Legis/o';"e Politics in the Arob World. p.2IS. Yemell's democr.llic opelling was
a rematkable and unforeseen development in the region.
l'Conversatioll with Yemeni cabinC't minister. FC'bruary 2001. Sana·a. Yemen.
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initially voiced its opposition to the changes but eventually acquiesced to thc president's
proposals in the subsequent national referendum. Their O\-vn lerms of offiee were also
extended two years. Parliamentary powers were weakened. and an appointed
consultative council expanded from 59 to III members (all appointed by the presidenl
as before). It was also given signifieanllegislative powers. some in conjunction with
parliament. but others apparently at the discretion of the president. Furthermore. national
parliamentary elections that might have threatened the govemment's control over the
parliament were postponed. in effect extending the term of the sitting parliament
retroactively.l6
Morocco
Unlike Yemen's dramatic opening, Morocco's democratic opening in 1996
requires a wider historical perspeclive. Independence. the monarchy's orchestration of
political parties and elections, and attempts at constitutional reform. all factor into an
understanding of Morocco's opening. NDI soon began to consider Morocco as the most
promising transition in the Middle East and North Africa. replacing Yemen in the
Institute'S view. A clearer appreciation for the roots of the transition and Moroccan
political history might have qualified that positive assessment.
The historic challenge of the monarchy in Morocco has been confirming its
legitimacy. On his succession in 1%1. King Hassan 11 immediately faced challenges to
3ft..·Proposed Changes to ConstilUlion." Internet On·lin.... URL: hnp:l/www.aI-bab.comiyemenlgov!
am...ndOO.htm. S«' also Brian Whitaker. MAvoiding Elections:' Middle East fnt"mal;Qnal66 (September
2000), URL: hnp:lh.\ww.al-bab-comfyernen/anic1mei66.hun.
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his rule. His response was predictable: he ran ··...a medieval absolutist statc.-n Using
tactics of repression. corruption and cooptation. the King ruled through ostensibly
participatory and modem institulions like elections. polilical parties and parliaments.it
The result was a ··...multi-pany electoral system... [lhal] operated essentially as a
mechanism to select. control and reproduce a docile. corruptible and dependent political
elite:')~ While numerous constitutional referendums allowed the King to claim a certain
legitimacy. election results were nonetheless rigged through a "complex meehanism of
political cooptation [he I concei .....ed and sustained:"'J
Political parties were therefore orchestrations of political competition and control
directed by Ihe palace: l Through the Minister of the 100erior. who in essence servcd as
Prime Minister. Hassan divided and controJled the parties. determined electoral
outcomes. and appointed (and dismissed) the government of his choice. Political parties
werehe1pless:
...political parties in Morocco are too ..eak to bring about demQ<;ratic change. While the
king'~ repression and manipulation have comributed to their ,,·ealmess. lhey also suffer
from two problems of their O"Tl making: an ideological \\'avering betvoeen nationalism
J7Abdcslam Maghrao~i."Political Authority in Crisis: Mohammed VI's MorQ<;co,- J/iddfe E.ul
R"porI 218. Spring 2001. p.lJ.
l'lbid.p.13.
lqlbid.p.l-l •
.o.olbidi. p.14.lmerior Minister Driss Basri wasevenrually dismissed by Hassan's son Mohammed
VI. prompting Basri 'firing parties' across Morocco. It has been one of the most dramatic de,'elopments
underthc::newmonarch.
~IThis orchestration results in the :nomis:nion ofthc:: paniesand public opinion: -au lieu de
politiser l'opinion publique, ce ftactionnement 1a demobilise." Abdelkibir Khalibi. L 'aIIUI1<l1lC" <:11"$
p/lrtispoliliqllt'S(CasabJ:mca: Editions Eddif,2000),p.22.
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and democr.lcy and a structural inabilil}' 10 Fu[fill their function as m~chanisms ofmass
~[itica[;nlegrationandrep~tation."
The first elections were held in May 1963. but a poor showing by palace-backed
panies led to the annulment ofvanous results and arrests ofopposition candidates. By-
elections in January 1964 led to a pro-palace majority.~i The tone was set for politics
Morocco-style.
King Hassan responded to economic riots in 1965 by disbanding parliament.
banning political party activity. and appointing himself prime minister. The country
remained without a parliament for 5 years.« The counU1··s second elections in 1970
were boycotted by the opposition. but in any event were rigg~ heavily in favour of the
pro-palace parties to remove an)' risk ofa repeat of 1965. Pro-palace parties won 220 of
the 240 seats contested: l Electoral meddling ensured ·...the parliament [served) as a
mere servant of the predatol)' state.·-.I/I
National elections were postponed again in the mid-se\'enties due in part to coup
attempts against the King. developments in the Western Sahara. and further economic
unr.:st. Parliamentary elections in 1977 were again dominated by palace-aligned
~lAbdeslam Maghraoui. ~Monarchy and Political Reform in Morotco:· )ou-mul of D.!fIlO':~UCY.
11.1 (:!OOt)p.77
~;Mary-Jane Decb. ··Moroceo:· World Encp:lopotdio o!Pu,Haflloi1l/S <lnd Loigis(rJfU~o!S, VvlufIl<! (
Ed. George Thomas Kurian (Washington: Con~siona[ Quarterly Incorporate. [99&). pp. 461-46&.
«James Kenercr. ,l/orrxro·s ,V...,' 8icaflle~al Purliafll<!1l/: Dc",oc~ulic Obsr..clot or Cuwln/:'
{Albany.NY:CcntreforLcgislati,·cSIUdie:;.1998'.p..l. .
'lDeeb,-Morocco:·p..l68.
.l6Kenerer. Morocco"s Ne.... 8icaml!~<11 P<lrliamem, p..l.
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partics.H Further unrest led 10 yel another postponement of national elections. to
September 1984. Again. the palace-backed parties did wcll.
By the late 19805. ~onomic pressures. increasing political dissatisfaction and the
growing Islamic threat led Hassan 10 extend effons to liberalize Ihe regime while at the
Tabk2.J
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'Omar Bendourou "Power and Opposilion in Morocco·· Journal of Democrnq·1.3 (19<13). 108-1:!2.
:-Histor)" of Morocco." Ministry ofCommunicaliOM. Rabat. Morocco. URL: hnp~·:"....w.mincom,gov.ma/
english/generalilies! historyihiSlOl)·,hlml. !AbderTahm3lle El·Yousouffi. Address 10 Moroccan Nalional
Media. Rabat. Morocco. to January :!OO2. URL: hnp:,"/,,,,,,w.pm.gov.malfrimagaJ':ine.'aclUalitci
lire.asp?clef":!:!11381:!: "the first lrallsparc:m and free consullatinns in an independcntMllTocco:'
SourceJ: Mary·Jane Deeb. -Morocco·' II"urld fn,,'l'IopeJia afParliamentS and legi$/arureJ Ed, GeQrge
Thomas Kurian. (Washington: Congressional Quanerl)' Incorporate. 1998). ppA61~68: ··Morocco
In-de~,''ICL. URL: http://,,....w.uni,wuerzburg.deilawl mo_inde~.hlml: and .IIQrocl'O: CUlml,,· Profii.!.
f999-](}()() (London: The Economisl Intelligence Unit. 2000).
same time ensuring his role as guaranlor of the state and commander of the faithful." In
an attempt 10 orchestrate an a/remanet!. Hassan offered the government to a coalition of
opposition parties following the 1993 elections. bUI the king was rebuffed. He lumed to
his old tactic of conslitulional refonn,
In 1996 a national referendum - the fourth such referendum since assuming
BOIce Maddy-Weitzman, ~From Hassan 10 Mohammed: A New Era for Morocco: PoliC)'
WalCh. 401 (30 July 199<1), URL: http://www.,,'ashingtoninslilUte.or!iwalchlPoliq'watchl
poli')....'alch 19<191401 ,hlm, A national referendum in 1989 e.'<lended the lenn ofoffkc of the 1986
parliament by two yean. as Hassan no doubt contemplated growing dissent. For a consideralion of the
conlradiclions in perceplions of the monarch as s~mbol of unity while also COrrupl and the pe~nalizalion
ofauthoritarian rule, see Maghraoui. -Monarchy and Political Rcfonn in Morocco."
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power - was held. to entice the opposition partit.'S to participate in govemmcnt.'Q
Changes included a directly elected lower house of parliament to replace the existing
house. one-third of whose members were appointed by the monarch. A second chamber
called the chambre des conseillcrs (Chamber ofCouncillorsl \vas also introduced. to be
elected through a system of electoral colleges representing trade councils. professional
associations and unions.'" The constitutional changes passed with a vote of96 percent.~1
Ultimately. though. the changes did little to reduce the powers and prerogatives of the
monarch.
The parliamentary elections which followed were reported to have been among
Morocco's fairest. While no party won a majority. the opposition parties tared well. and
in February 1998 King Hassan appointed Abderrahmane Yousouni as Prime Minister.
Yousouffi was head oftne Union socialistes des forces populaires (USFP). a leading
opposition party. He had gone into exile following the 1993 national elections. after
Hassan's failed bid to entice the opposition to accept the charge to form a government.
Following his appointment as prime minister. Yousouffi proposed a cabinet drawn from
'QDecb. ~Morocco.- pA69. National constifutional referendums .....ere held in 1962. 1970. 1972.
t992. and 1996. Three additional refefendurns were hetd fO modiFy particular anicles orthe constitution.
and a fourth to vote on joining fhe Arab-African National Union. ~e :Ilso URL:
hnp:/lwww.mincom.gov.maIenglislllgeneralifies/state_Wclection.htm!.
"'For more. scc KCMerer. ~From One Chamber to Two: The C:ISe of Morocro.~s.:conJ Cltambttrs
Eds. Nicholas D. Baldwin and Donald Shell (Portland: Fr.mk Cass Publications, 2001), pp.1 J5-1 SO.
~IOnly Olle opposition party - thc Organizatioo de I'action democratiquc et populaire (OADP)-
opposedlhe changes. They .....en: subsequendy subjei:t to govemmem har:l5Sment and internal divisions dUll
splitlhe party. Interview wifh member ofthe OADP e~ecutive.OADP Party Headquarters. Casablanca.
Mo~eo,12May2000.
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seven different political parties. mostly from the .KomIa' or opposition coalition. but
also including a palace-aligned party. the RassemblemcnI national dL'S independents
(RJ'lI).I: The hand of the monarch still weighed heavy in Moroccan politics.
Moroccan Po"iomenl: Chamber ofRepresell'a'i",~s
The Moroct:an parliament is bicameral and comprised ofa dirt.'Ctly elected
Chamber of Represenlatives and a new indirectly elected Chamber ofCouncillors. the
result of the new constitution passed in a referendum in 1996. The previous unicameral
chamber was two-thirds elected. with the remaining one third appointed by the king.
The current lower house is comprised of 325 members. elected in a single member
district. tirst-past-the-post system. There are currently 10 party caucuses in the chamber
ranging from radical left-wing to moderatc-eentre. lJ The chamber is led by a speaker
elected in the first plenary meeting. He heads the presidium which consists of six house
officers - himself and deputy speakers - and other parliamentarians (called Ol/mana. a
traditional Arabie word meaning ·trusted counselor"j who are elected by the plenary
scssion.l<O
11The cabinet is made of seven different panies, but is suppofled by two others in parliament "'ho
do not have representatives in cabinet E""Jp<l: Middle East and Norlh Africa Year Boole 1999 (London:
Europ;! Publications. 1m) and COllnt')' Profile/or Morocco: 1999.]()()() (London: Economist Imelligence
Unit. 1m).
IJSixleen parties contested the elections, with 12 electing members. bul IWO - the OADP and
MPCD - did nOl have suffidenl MPs elected 10 constitute caucllSC'S, Khatibi, L 'allemonce ,,/I,,~ par/is
polilique~, p.21.
l<OConvc11ilIlions wilh parliamentary staff Chamber ofRepresemalivcs. Rabat. Morocco. June
1000,
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The prerogatives of the lower chamber include the ability to propose legislation.
amend laws. and question ministers orally and in writing. It can also hold a vote of
confidence in thc government programme when it is first constituted. and can dismiss
the government by a simple majority vote. Theoretically. preeminence is given to the
lower chamber. but the upper chamber has also been given the power to censure the
government (a power shared by only two other upper chambers in the world. in Italy and
South Africa).!l The upper chamber ean therdore dismiss the government by a (wo-
third's vote. initiate legislation. conduct inquires. and issue a warning motion which
obligates the prime minister to appear before the chamber in defense of the issues
contained in the motion.!oI> The lower chamber does not share Ihis power.
There are six permanent committees in the Moroccan lowc:r house. consisting of
54 members each. making them unwieldy. They are broadly divided by the following
themes: foreign affairs. justice. interior. finance. resource industries and social and
Islamic affairs. Ad-hoc comminc:es on special matters may a(so be constituted b)' the
house. c:ither al the rcquc:st of the monarch or the majority of members of the house.
Committees membership is proponional. based on pan)' membership in the chamber.
and each parliamentary group proposes its members. Any deputy can attend any
committee meeting and panicipate in debate. but may nOI vote. Chairpersons arc elected
HAnicles 76-77. Const;tution of.llorocro. /996. URl.:
hup:J/wv..w.al-bab.com"maroc!gov:con96.hnn.
~aljonal Democnuic Inslirutc for International Affairs. L<!gis/at;I'" Baseline D<1ta (Rabat
National Democralic Inslirule for InlemalionaJ AITairs.. lkl:ember :!OOOl. p.6.
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by the plenary. also on a proportional basis.
All bills muSI be considered in committees before being voted in the plenary
session. As with mosl parliaments. the majority of bills originate with the executi\'e
branch. though the Moroccan chamber is active in this respect. Bills are scheduled for
house consideration by thc board or presidiwn ofparliament.~1 Comminees can also
subpoena witnesses or documents. This was done recentl~' in a special inquiry ofa
banking scandal in Morocco. but it is a rarely exercised. power: the inquiry is only the
second in the history ofMorocco's parliament.!' Committees may in\'ilt:: expcns as pan
of their consideration of bills. though Ihis is not current practice. Committee meetings
are. unfortunately. closed to the public.
T.lbW2."
CClICnil ElectiD. ResutlJ· Sao i. MonJCCII.l HOIIH or Reprt:Kotllliv"
"., '997
USFP
"
57
RNI
" "
UC
PI
"
3:!
MP 13
"
MDS 32
17A fair number ofbi1ls DO originate in the parliJ.ll"lent. more so than in mOS1 parliaments: their
chance of actual passage is reduced comparc:d 10 go"ernment bills. ChJ.ll"lberofReprescn131i'·C'S.Legislati,·e
Services Division. Hi/an genera! do'S projels e' do'S proposi'ion do' lois (Rabat Morocco: Legislative
Services Division. Augu.st:!OOO).
lSCOnVel'Slllion I'ith ChaifTllan. Foreign Affairs Commilt«'. Chamb<:r ofRepre'SCmali\'cs.
~ember:!OOO.
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1111
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Total Seats 333 325
'Ela::u:dlRdlrecllylhroughprof~~ionalassoclauons.unlonsandlocaladJmmstr.mons
SOllrc<,s; "Elections Watch:' Jar/mal ofCkmocra0' ~.! (October 1993): Kevin JoIlnson and
Arsa[a 'kane. Caf1SIl/lurions ""jln .lforO<.'can Political Purli<,~ unJ Cil,ic Organi=ati<ms: Trip
R..port: OClOb", IS fo JI. f9 fr. (W3$lIinglon. DC: National Democrafic Inslitute for
IntemalionaIAffairs.I997I,p.:!3.
A secretary general (or 'head' parliamentary clerk) is appointed direclly by the
king. to whom he owes allegiance. Ultimately this impeded our work as the secretary
general of the parliament was strongly opposed to NDrs presence.
There are numerous constraints on the lower house's powers - besides the upper
house - all of which reneet the subordination of parliament to the monarch. First. there
are no limits on the king's legislative authority. whereas the parliamem possesses a
limited authority on questions of defense. religion. and the monarchy. Second. lhe
pariiamem possesses only a limited veto. whereas the King ean ultimately submit
legislation to national referendum and thereby contcst the legislature's \\ill. Third. the
king can dissolve parliament and rule by decree. a power thai has been exercised t\\ice
since 1965. Fourth. the king sets the dale for parliamemary eleclions. sometimes
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postponing them 10 the ad\'antagc of palace.aligned parties.'" Finally. the king is under
no obligation to appoint a prime minister based on the parliament's composition.""
Morocco's new parliament remains perhaps the most predisposed to democracy
in the countr:"s histor:·. \\ith less ofa built·in bias to favour the palace than the previous
parliament.'" Yet at worst the parliament risks serving as part of a facade in an
authorilarian regime."~ NDI itsclfnoled in one of its repons that Morocco's political
parties (and their resulting placement in parliament) are a simple manifestation of the
political \\ill of the king."J Still. NDI felt the countr:"s democracy was progressing, and
reported that most Morocco walchers were optimistic about the democratic advances
made there.... Many observers thought precisely the opposite. Assessments of longtime
Morocco watchers such as Catherine Sweet, Gregor:' White and Guilian Denoeu.'( were
less optimistic.
Denoeux also \\TOte that electoral fraud in Morocco suggests parliamen~' seals
!9Guilain o.:noo:ll.~. D.!1I11x:ruq AuesslI1ent o[.\fonxcu (Washinglon; M;mag~menl Systems
Inlemalional.August 1998).p.81.
"IGregory Whil~. -The Ad"n1t of EIKIoral ~mllCracy' in Morocco? The Referendum of 19'>6.-
.\fiddle Easl Journal SI. J (Summer 1991). p_J9J. as cited in K~nt!rer. J!or'o<xo's .\'ev.- Bi('all1l!ral
Parliament. p.9.
"~Kenerer. .Horot;<:o 's Sew Bicameral Por!iame!tl, p.:!.
">Nalional ~mllCratic InslilUte for Inlemalional Affairs, Programml! dl! renforcemellt des par/is
poIi/i'lue au ,I/aroc (Rabat National Democr:ltic InstilUle for Inlernational Affairs. 29 May 2000). p. I
""Nalional Democralic IlI$1ilUle for Inl('malional Affairs. CEPPS:.YDI Quurler(1" R"porl: Januuf')
1to .\Iwch J I. 1999 J/orO<:ro: Enhancing Legislatwl! and Political Purly Capacity" (WashinglOn:
National DernllCr.lIic Institute for Inl('lllalional Affairs. April 1999). p.:!.
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are given out in a quota system before ballots are ever counted.M Catherine Sweet called
the Moroccan parliament ··...a classic pseudo-democralic institution.. :'that added to the
regime's powers rather than limiting or controlling it.!>6 Another academic who observed
the Moroccan elections in 1993 reported in the .\fiddle East Report that the results were
determined by the King before voting had even started, and resulted in a powerless
parJiament.~7 The International Foundation for Electoral Systems monitored the 1993
elections in Morocco and reported .....elections are no mechanisms of fundamental
change in Morocco because the Palace wields ultimate power:....
According to a more recent assessment, Morocco's changes are thus far finely
tuned manipulations giving only the appearunce of change..... Even with a new king.
oplimism is notahundanl: "the main structure ofgovemment and Ihe handling of power
will remain more or less the same. Power \\ill be exercised much in the same way as
MGuilain Oenocux and Abd~lamMaghraoui. -King Hassan's Polil~al Dualism in Morocco:'
JffJJ/e eusl PoIkf. 5." (January 1998), p.IIJ.
Ilo6Catherine Sweet. -Democratization \\"ith Democracy: Polilical Openings and Closures in Modem
Morotco:' UfdJ/.: easl R.:porr. JI (Spring 2001). p.2".
61Henry Munson Jr. -International El«tion Moniloring: A Crilique Based on One Monitor·s
Experience in Morocco.- .If/dd/e EDsr R,:plm. Winler 1998. Munson OOles that inadequacies in the conducl
ofthel99Jel«lion{suchasthegovemment'sfailu.retorc:lcascofficiallocalvotetallies)\Verell:~31edin
the 1997d«:tiOfls.
~omasC. Bayer. .\Iurocco. Dir':CI L<'gis/al/ve £/«riorlI. June 15. J99J: R.:porl of/ho: IFES
Moniloring and Obun·olion Ddegol/orII (Washington: Illlemational Foundation for Electoral Systems.
19(3). as cited in Munson. "lnlemational El«tion Monitoring.- .lfiJd/.: £ast Reporl. p.l .
....Karim Mezran ~Morocco after Hassan 11.- .\fidd/.: £USllnr"lIigence Bull.:/in. 2.8 (5 Sept 2000).
p.l.
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before with only minor changes to make its facade more appealing to the outside:·7Q
According to Keuerer. the closest observer of the Moroccan parliament. the new
bicameral parliament was an anempt on the part of King Hassan to remove the monarchy
from political battles by selling up the indireetly clected upper chamber as political
counterweight to the directly elected. more representative. lower chamber. which he had
to otTer as a concession to the opposition. As While and Ketterer both note. Hassan
faced the challenge of incorporating political parties in a regime of questionable
legitimacy: the new parliament was not the resolution of the alienation. but rather the
method of cooption."
The risk that the new bicameral parliament will be used to simply maintain an
authoritarian system with democratic window-dressing has therefore been
acknowledged. A debate is even underway in Morocco on the role of the Sttond
chamber in impeding democrac~·. and certain voices from both political parties and the
national media are calling lor its abolition. or.
Logic suggests that the parliament is simply the new tool for cooption. Judging
lC MelT.1l1. -Morocco after Has!>ilI111.~ p.2. 5« also Michael J. Willis. "After Hassan; A New
Monarch in Monx:co:' .If"dit"TToneon Politics, 4. 3 (Autumn 1999). and zakya Daoud 3Ild Alxkmahum
Kader. -Aclj,;isme du monatllue. immobilisme du government; le Maroc ch3llge+il Vl1Iimen(?" Le Mond"
Diplomoliqui!(February 2000), p.14.
7lKenerer. "From One Chamber 10 Two.~ p.136. In this anicle Kenerer Ie;ms to the glass-half full
side of the ;malogy.;md suggestS the new bicameral parliamenl add.reSSC'S concerns ofrepresentali\'eness
and mbility 001 adequalely covcm::l in the previous unicameral parliamenl.
r.Abdelaziz Jazouli. '"Trois scenes parlementaires~ Le Temps du .\faroe. 242 (161une 2000). p.J.
Also. KenereT. -From One Chamber 10 T\\"o....- Both the PP5;md OADP lIa\'e as part of their elet:loral
plalfonns the abolishment of the upper chamber.
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trom the results of the 1997 dection - and Prime Minister Yousouffi and the
opposition's record in power thus far - this is precisely what has happened.7l The parties
have once again been co-opted into the regime's balancing act. The direclly elected
lower house is impeded by the upper chamber. the opposition has been brought into
power without possessing true legislative authority. and the ministers serve the king. not
the parliament. The panies that comprise parliament are themselves the king's creations.
"as he simultaneously perpetuates their existence and fragments them:·a The parliament
is simply one more part of the puzzle as the monarchy and the elite work to ensure their
ov,"I1 stability and legitimacy.7' The detadunent of the Moroccan civil society from the
institution is understood in this conlcxt.'~ The final reality is parliament has a historic
record of subservience to the monarch that will be hard if not impossible to ovcrcome.
and the majority of Moroccans are understandably skeptical that things will change.n
Parliament faces a constitutional bias favoring the king. not to mention the
histol)' ofa manipul:llcd elecloral and political party system. Constitutional provisions
ensure the monarch is the ultimate voice in Moroccan politics_ and numerous
constitutional provisions allow for laws passed by parliament to be vetoed. Royal
7lAli llT1r.lbd. "Pourquoi a-[·i1 dlange':'M D.!moin 17 (1000). pp.l0-12
7'Kenerer. -Morocco's New Bicameral Parliament:' p.15.
71As one academiC noted. Hassan II orchestrated e~ery COnS[llUtion of the kingdom [0 ensure both
the monan:h's place in lhe s[a[c and <he suoordlnatlon to Itofall other pclitlcal'nslilulions."hclher
Icgislali\'c.c~eCuti>·corjudicial.-Bcndourou.-Po\\'erandOppcsitioninMorocco:·p.I09.
7~Con"e~lionwith Moroccan parllamenlarians. London. UK DeccrnlKr :!OOO
nMaghraoui. 'Monarchy and Polilical Reform ,n Morocco: p.75.
-39-
prerogatives and administrative maneuvers emasculate the parliament.~ Ketterer is
right: "Unless Morocco can peacefully generate politically representati\"e institutions. the
democratization process will likely remain in the hands of predatory rulcrs whose
commitment 10 the process is tenuous...:·1<t The politics of present-day Morocco remains
much like that of the Morocco of the independence era: nothing has really changed
except perhaps the face of the regime.1I(\
The above history therefore provides a background 10 the democratic transitions
undelv;ay in Yemen and Morocco. including briefoverviews of thdr respective
legislatures. and the environment in which I conducted legislative development. Even
such a cursory overview as I have provided here would ha\"e been invaluable to me had
it been available when I began my work. as an explanation of the origins of the
democratic openings in the respective countries. Moreover. it might have influenced
NOI not to work with the parliament. in Morocco in particular.
111bict.p,76,
7'>Kenerer. "Morocco's New Bicameral Parliament: p.ll.
IOMark Hubbard. Utlfriorl of/he Prophf!t: The Struggle fV' blum (Boulder: Westview Press.
1998).p.98.
-10-
Chapter] Mf Work Experience
This chapter will provide an overview of my experience working with the
legislatures of Yemen and Morocco conducting long-tenn legislative programmes. for
1\'10 and a halfand one year respectively. This chaptcr will provide the background
leading to the critical assessmenl of the literature to follow in chapter 4. While 1am
focusing on Yemen and Morocco. my first experience in the field of legislative
development was leading a two-month programme in Madagascar in early 1996. This
was followed by my participation in an NDI assessment of the National Assembly of
Togo, helping the Institute detennine what programme it might conduct in that country. I
am however limiting my consideration to the long-t~nn programmes on which I worked
as the Madagascar and Togo programmes were both ofshonerdurations. ' I \\;11 draw on
the Madagascar experience briefly in the closing chtlpter.
My job in Yemen and Morocco was to administer the Institute's programmes in
each country. in all its facets. Field representatives organize the activities thtlt make up
the Institute's work. provide consultations and documentation to partners. represent the
Institute in diplomatic and govemment meetings. Duties also included extensh'e
programme management and administration such as managing in-eounll')' budgets.
writing weekly or bi·weekly political and programme reports to Nor in Washington. and
providing input into the planning for future programmes. In summar)'. the position
IMadagascar was in fact in a tWlHllonlh programme 10 uecule a legislali\'e assiSlarKC programme.
,,'hereas Togo was a lO-day missiOll 10 assess noecds and opporrunities fora legislallvc assiSlancoe
programme,
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involved both the organization and facilitation ofNDl"s programmatic work as well as
'public relalions' type aClivities including oUlreach to other international organizations
and negotiations with local actors and government officials.
Specific wrilten tcrms of reference are sometimes given to field representatives
before their placement in the field. Representatives also visit NDl"s headquarters in
Washington to meet .....ith staff and to obtain background to NOl"s work. No specific
terms of reference were drafted for my placement in either Yemen or Morocco. though
briefing 'binders' were supplied. These contained limited programme information and
political background about the country. and one or two academic articles on some aspect
of the country's politics. Neither. remarkably. contained information about the reSIX"1::tive
legislatures in which I would work. Each ofNOl"s programmes is the fruit ofa
particular programme proposal (and these were included in the briefing materials).
Neither the Yemen nor Morocco progro.mmes were based on assessments. unlike
NOI's work in Madagascar and Togo.' The lack of either a comprehensi\'e or even
cursory assessment of either country's parliament (though the Institute worked in bofh
countries before my arrival) detailing their powers or functions. is revealing.; Also.
given thaI I arrived in both countries after programme activities had already been
![ look at the issue llr=ssm~nlS in tM ne.~t chapler.
.;An NOI team did visil Morocco in 19'17. but no parliamentary assessmenl was ConduCle<l. See
Johnson and Deane. COrlSlI/wtions ",ilh .\/croccan Political P<1rties.
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defined. my ability to adjust them was limited:
Vemen
NDrs work in Yemen began \\ith u short-termobsen'ution mission to the 1993
elections. A long term presence began in 1996. training political party poll watchers for
the 1997 parliamentary elections. NOI followed \\ith an election obsen'ation mission to
the April 19Q7 parliamentary election. leading to my placement as the first permanent
field representative in May 19Q7.
The Yemen programme was initially a nine-month political party programme.
but on being hired I ....."as directed to attempl 10 work wilh the legislature. not on the busi~
ofany needs as!iessment. but on the basis of perceived need or NOl's instincilhat this
\\"as the area in which the Institute should now work. \\'hile NOI felt the 1997 elections
were a positive step in Yemen's transition. they had resulted in a parliament heavily
fa\'ouring the governing OPe. which had won two-thirds of the seats. The gO\'emment's
control of the legislature had therefore increased, and the opposition's significantly
weakened. NOI felt that the parliament could benefil from NDi support on parliamentary
functions and general training.
The high percentage of new members· 170 of 301 members were new alter the
1997 elections • meanl most parliamenlarians had no tmining or experience in
'This was les5 true in Yemen, where the duralion ofmr in-<:OtJntry placemem allo"ed me 10 have
substantial inpul intosubsequcnlprogr.l/Tlmes.
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parliamemary atTairs, and had a limited notion of the role and function of parliament.
Their work "..as further impeded by inadequate material resources. NDrs goal was to
strengthen the capacity of dcputies to perform their duties through basic parliamemary
trnining on topics including committee functions, caucus organization and stalT
functions.
The work was undertaken in what came to be called a 'panies in parliament'
approach: working \\ith parties but concentrating on their caucuses and work in
parliumem as opposed to parties outside the parliamem.! In anticipation ofour
programme (and the absence of any knowledge about the parliament) I conducted a hasty
assessment of the parliamentary committees direclOrale. including a review ofintcmal
by-laws. the presence of material resources, and staft' education levels!
My work was initially aided when I disco\"ered an as~ssment of the Yemeni
legislature wrinen by a Dutch parliament~· clerk in Del:ember 1996, conducted under
the auspices ofrhe Inler.Parliamcnttll1· Union in Geneva.' The as~ssment was a
~Atthe same time NO! conducted party worl: outside thc parliament. with the YSP, the GPC and
the Islah, as well as with the Supreme Coordination Council. a coalition ofsmaHcr opposilion parties.
6 Sutler, r~m~n House ofPeople's Depu/it's, p..:!.
1Alben J.B. Hubert. Ritporl of/he .\"e..,b .~sussmen/ .\/issi,Jn to ,hI' House ofRep'..senta/r..es of
"emen: 8-/9 Decembe, 1996 (Gene.-a: Inter-parliamentary Union. 1996). Whil.: a llawed=sment. this
is the I.:ind ofinformatioo that could have been in th.:briefinibooks for field reprts.:nt;ltives. as \\ell as the
BaakJini stud>' of the parliament. ~The legal. Political and Informatioo Dim.:osions of Yemen's Tr.lllSition
to Democr.lcy:'
precursor to a large parliamentary strengthening programme to be funded by the UNOP.'
It was a technical analysis of the parliament. dealing mostly with questions of material
resources. Nonetheless the author offered an assessment oflhe capacity and centrality of
the Parliament al lhe same time. writing "I found a well-run and effecli\'e Parliament. It
is a real power in the land. not a figurehead or rubber-Slamp. It is active and apparently
well-appreciated by the constitucnts....Proposals are sometimes really amended and
occasionally even rejected.... Plenary sessions are conducted in a professional manner:'"
Nothing in the report substantiated that positive assessment (ifit were true. a well-run.
effective. powerful. aCtive. well-appreclated legislalUres that even occasionally amended
or rejected government bills would not. one assumes. require international assistance).
The reality was different. The parliament was often by-passed by cabinet decrees.
constituents had no access to parliament. and plenaI)-' sessions were haphazard and did
not follow the by-laws. A situation analysis such as the one above. on which the
assessment was based. was entirely flawed. 'o
Erroneous. misinformed. and ill-researched. the report also ignored the politics of
the chamber. It was conducted five months prior to the 1997 election. and therefore
failed to take into account the political configuration of the ne\\- parliament. including
*The programme budgel was just O\'er US$ I million. and NO! e\'enlually applied 10 eX«Ule
appro.ximalely $360.000 ofthe programme. United Nalions Development Programme. r~m~n. GO\'ernanc~
C<IfXl<"ityanJ Ins/i/ulianal RO!/urm. (Sana'a: United Nalions Development Programme. 19C17).
YEMi971~OO.
9Huben. Rep0l"/ o/the N"eds Assessment Mission. p. ~.
IOlbid p..:!.:!.
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the non·presence of the YSP. which had boycotted the election. No mention was made
of the political configuration of the parliament even at the time the report was written:
ncither the nwnber of parties represemed nor the presence of independent
parliamentarians was noted.
The assessmem noted that most committees had to make do with traditional
cushions lining the walls of committee rooms, in the absence of budgets for furnilure. A
recommendation was made for budgets 10 be accorded for the purchase of tables and
chairs. II This is not an issue of'make do· but rather the tradilional form ofseating in
Yemen. The report also stated that committees had real influence. and yet was unsure
how many committees there were. I:
Ultimately. the assessment focused on material needs of the sian: rather than
assessing powers and prerogatives of parliamentarians. sUlIT capacity or educational
backgrounds. or parliamenfs overall power or capacity in relation to the executh'e
branch. Material needs were indeed great. with few computers. limited ollice space. and
poor stalling procedures and remuneration. The report recommended 20 new
photocopiers. 50 computers (20 to include CD·ROM and modems for internet access). at
leasl20 printers, and two tlathed scanners. It said "Parliament seems to he able to really
Il lbid,p.8.
I:Hubert. Report ofthe Needs Assessment Mission, p.5. The report also nOled lhat 'surprisingly'
the parliament had no public gallery, and said the parliament should consider one as a means of increasing
both transparency and goodwill. Parliamem does indeed have a rarely used public gallery above the plenary
chamber (used by lhe media and less lTeijuendy Not Slam. A Sl:par.1te diplomatic gallery is on the noor of
the charntJer at the opposite end ofthecllamber. The isslle with the public gallery is oneoflimiled access.
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operate thesc..systems....AIl departments...can put more computers to use.'·1l No
evaluation was made of who could use computers or for what purpose. During my 0 ....T1
visit to the Committees Directorate. I discovered three computers. two were not in use.
When I asked why. I was told no one knew how to operate them. Il
The problem of the parliament. as I began to say in Yemen. was not a . flat-bed
scanner" one. They did not need 50 new computers. or even flatbed scanners. Instead.
the challenges facing the parliament were related to capacities that derived from an
inadequate understanding of what the parliament was supposed to do. and how MPs
could fulfill their roles. II was a matter of democratic education. not new equipment.
That most donors only see the latter is recognized in Carothers' critique of
democracy aid. 11 There are two reasons for this: first. it is easier to otTer material
resources. such as computers or library resources: second. there is a general sensitivity
among donors regarding political development and education. Donors are reluctant to
confront the larger questions of what it really means for parliamentarians to do their
work as this might be seen as meddling. This is so even where parliamentarians
explicitly want the latter kind of aid. to leam more about what it means to be a
parliamentarian. As one deputy said after an NOt seminar on committee functions in
Sana·a. the example of the US Congress drew his attention beeause it determined the
Ulbid.p.IS.19.
I~Conversation.Yahiaal-Sharki. DirectorofComminees. House ofRepresematives. July 11l97.
ISCarothers• Aiding DemtXrucy Abroad pp.171l·11l1.
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budgets of all the ministries and supervised them. thereby giving the legislature real
power.l~ That is not the kind of response many donors would be happy to record on
completion ofan aid programme. particularly if they are already working .....;th ministers
in the executive branch. Donors prefer...the provision of bells and whistles...or training
in apolitical areas...to the more politically sensitive (and potentially more valuable)
assistance..:· 11 NDrs strength is in conducting the very work olherdonors will often not
do.
My initial work and committee directorate assessment led to an application for a
portion of the UNDP funds that had prompted the Dutch Clerk's input, This would allow
NDI to execute a comprehensi\'e programme in parliament. and 10 shift the programme
from one of material resources to basic education and training. Monies would still be
available for some computers. as foreseen by the Dutch assessment. but NDI designed a
programme that would make usc of more seminars and roundtables. documentation and
consultations. to provide a more basic 'parliamentary education' programme without the
use of highly paid European consultants (one of whom was to be paid USS70.000 for 9
months pan-time work).'1
In the first eight months in-country. NO! conducted an assessment of the
16Conversalions with vario~ parlicipanlS during the NDl Seminar on the Rote orComminees in an
Effccl!\'e Legislarure, Sana'a Yemen, October 1997. See also National Democr.l1ic InSli{Ule for
lmemational Affairs. The Ro/tojCommilltes in un EffeCfr.'<! Legis/a/uf'<!. Sana·a. Yemen: OClobt!r 17-19,
/997 (WiI5hington, DC: National Dcmocr.l1ic Institute for International Affairs. 1997).
P Melia..Review.p.4.
IIUNDP, l"emen. GOlWnance Capacity und Insrifufionul Rltjorm. p.8.
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Committees Directorate (which had not been planned for in the programme). and
organized and conducted a large three-day conference on "The Role of Committees in an
Effective Legislature:' held in October 1997. The Institute also submitted a proposal for
a more extensive parliamentary programme to the UNDP. In party work. NDI
conducted a two-day seminar on political party reform for the YSP. which had boycotted
the 1997 election (it was also attended by several YSP parliamentarians elected as
independents).
In 1998. NDI continued to work with the parliament. beginning the year with a
one.day seminar for parliamentary staff with a lead researcher from the Congressional
Research Services of the Library of Congress. We conducted most of OUf seminars.
however. under the "panies in parliament"" rubric. with the expectation of obtaining a
portion of the UNO? funds for strict and more detailed parliamentary work. My own
auention ....'35 aimed more at parties outside parliament while we waited for the UNDP
funds to be approved. NDI continued to concentrate its efforts on the YSP. on the topic
of party reform. The Institute also conducted political party roundtables on the role of
women in politics and opposition functions.
After my first year NDI received a US State Depanment grant to work with
parliamentarians on issues related to constituency relations. managed by additional
staff. 14 NDI also received the grant for a Parliamentary External Relations Programme
I~emonies were disbursed through US·AID. but were actually US State Depanmenl democracy
promotioll$ funds: National Democratic Jn~titute for lmemalional AlTairs. .. YeMEN: Parliament"s external
Refalio/lS" US-AID Coope"atn.'e "~gree",efll No .~£P.5./68·A"(}()'50J8-00. (Washington. DC: National
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from the US State Depanment in late 1998. an optimistic programme conceived and
designed to increase the capacity of members to represent etTectivcly their constituencies
and build relalions \~;th cilizens groups."" The programme was designed by an NDI
stalTer who had never worked with a parliament let alone in a transitional democracy. It
was also an example of ignoring the academic literature on Arab parliaments and
democratization. noted in Ihe literature review.~l
Baaklini. Denouex. and Springborg suggest that Arab parliamems are
increasingly likely to play their proper legislative roles. and also can serve as indicalors
of liberalization ifnot democratization in the Arab world. a region long resistant to the
democracy.!! Parliamemary functions.lhey suggest. can be summarized as either outputs
(passing laws or executive oversight) and inputs (represeming constiluents and serving
as ombudsman). In the face oflimiled resources and strong compelition. the authors
suggest that Arab parliaments can best be assisted by supponing their imemal capacities
Democrotic lnstitule for tnlernational Affairs. 19'ilS).
"The progr.11T1Ine was conceived and designed by DC·based slaffwho had neither woned with nor
in Yemen's parliament or any other tranSilional democr.:uic parli:nnent, II was eventually rejigged and run
by an NOI staffer with ntensive experience in the fOfTller Yugoslavia.
!I Sce Robert Springborg. -Legislalive Development as a Key Element ofStrnlegies for
Democrotizalion in llle Arob World." Arab Studies Journal (Spring (995). See also Baaklini et al.
LegisJ"'ln'ePofitic$ inlhe,~rab World,
l!Melia.. Review. pp.4-5, Melia notes lhat the aulhors have )'1.'1 to publish assessmenlS of the
conduct of legislative development Pfogrammes. and suggeSlS one might read into lhal thaI they think it is
eilhCTinadequaleOl'unS!Jccessful,ltmaybe.hesays,anobliquecritiqueofwesterndonors'efTOflS.ppA-5,
The authors are, as Melia ROles (himselffontlCT Vice-President ofprogrammes at NOll. highly-regarded
SChO[ilfS on the Arab world. widely·published. and with eXlensive backgrounds in legislalive development
-50-
in the face of dominant executive branches. and not by increasing citizen demands on
parliaments which do not have the capacity to respond.
Carothers characterizes the output and input dislinction as two forms of
parliamentary assislance. one being top-down. the other bottom up. Top-down donor
assistance concentr.ues on aiding the parliament with troining. education or resources.
and is the conventional model. Bottom-up assistance is less frequent and involves
assisting NGOs or other aid rccipients to either change legislation or legislative
behaviour (i.e. make a parliament more representative).~J Furthermore. where a will to
refonn does not exist or is offset by -serious institutional deficiencies. a bottom-up
approach is the recommended method of donor assistance. ~~
In 1999. my attention turned 10 the Emerging Democracies Forum~~ but NOI
also launched the UNDP funded programme of parliamentary support with a workshop
on executive-legislative relations. The v.'orkshop had been recommended by both the
committee seminar the previous year and parliamentary and executive-branch leaders.
Despite this and a public signing ceremony attended by UNOP and parliamentary
~>The Fomm was an intemalional summit for key actors and decision-makers in a sub-set of
emerging democraeies overlooked by Ihe international communiI)' and media. A tJuee.day conference in
Sana'a brought together a range of piayers from 16 countries. ranging flom prc~idents and prime ministers
!O NGO activislS. fO sit and diKuss besl practices and lessons learned in democmtic refonn. URL:
hup:llwww.ndi.orgled17inde.~.htm.
officials~6. and despile NOt's hopes· the UNOP funds were never forwarded and NOr's
programme was stalled by internal polilics and corruption in parliament. as well as
ineffective UNOP oversighl of the programme.~1 My recommendation 10 NOI had been
nOI to proceed with Ihe seminar until the UNOP monies came Ihrough. but NDI felt
launching the programme might expedite that funding. Regretlably. it did not.
At the same time NOI continued with its State Department-funded programme.
ignoring the warning signs noted above. The programme later faced a rebellion of
several prominenl parliamentarians who wanted to stall NOr's work. which included
boycolts of the Inslilute's work by the IWO prominent caucus chairs (from the ope and
Islah parties).!·
Yemen's parliament is still oversh3dowed by Ihe executive branch. Parliamentary
elections were recently postponed by Ihe presidcnt withoul significant proIL'St. and a new
(appointed) legislative council was created with powers in competition with Ihe elected
parliament. Attempts by the parliamenl to change the local administralion law were
rebuffed by thc president.!"
16"NOI aoo Parliament Sign Aceonl" Y~m..n Tim~s. 8, ~l (December 1998), p.2. Also availal>1e at
URL: Ilttp:Jfwv..w.yemclltimcs_cornl9&iiss4l/ln.htm
:1~NDl and Parliament Sign Accord.- Yemen Timf!S, p.2.
l'Anempts by bolh these pemlnalilies to set their respective party members to also bo~on NDl"s
programmes failed. Carothers n(){e5 Ihe imponance of~ogniringvihere the will to reform is missing.
Carothers. Aiding [kmrxrocy AbrooJ. p.306.
!"Conversation with NO! Starr, Sana'a, Yemen. February 2001.
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Democratic progress is perhaps stalling.. if not reversing..;o Key democratic
reformers were dropped from cabinet in a recent shuffle. and a national referendum was
used to push through constitutional changes despitll massive irregularities. These
included the govemmenfs refusal [0 revise the electoral list as required by law.
Hundreds of thousands of electors - mostly opposition YSP party supporters who had
boycoued the 1997 elections and therefore not been registered since the 1993 elections-
were thereby prevented from voting. ll
The outlook is bleak. and yet. the parliament is active. It includes voices that
criticize the government. it has used its powers to stall the govenunenrs budgets, and it
has served as a voice for the opposition. even during the civil war. l : The parliament is a
source of power that the executive must take into account, It is deserving ofdevelopment
support. The same can not be said for Morocco's parliament.
Work in Morocco
The Institute's work in Morocco was prt.oceded by a visit oflnstitute stalTin 1993
to attend a locally organized conference on human rights. At that time, staff determined
~alional Democratic Institute r~ Inlernational Affairs. Sraufflem ojthe NDl Pre~ll!c/ion
Delegatioll/o Yemen·s April 1001 Parliamentary Elec/ion, (Sana·a: National Democratic Instilute for
International Affairs, 2000), p.2. The statement reads. "It appears 10 us that Yemen's democratic transition
has slalled.~
llAlong with NOI in<oontry 51aftl observed the referendum procc:;.s over the COUl'SC ora IO-day
mission to Yemen in february 2001. No formal reponor assessrnent was made. but NOI warned a sense of
what was Ilappening and...-hether thc panics "'·ere panieipating in the proccs5
l:Baaldini et a1. Legu/oti....: Politics i" the .~rob World. pp.211-2IJ.
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there was an insufficient level of opening to work full-time in the country. In 1997 NDI
returned to conduct two weeks ofconsultations. following on the 1996 constitutional
reform. The ti~t objective was to provide election monitoring advice to political actors.
but a second obj~tive was 10 determine opportunities ··... for future democratic
institution building:';:; It was not. in fact. a comprehensive assessment: a legislative
programme had already been decided on. according to the report of the meetings.J.l In
any event. the consultations included only three MPs and the SecTClary General of
parliament - no speaker or deputies. and no minister of parliamentary affai~.;'
NDrs began working in Morocco full·time in 1998. with a USS644.000
programme ofsuppon to parliament and parties. The programme had two objectives: to
help legislators become more responsive. informed la....makers and constituent
repres<:ntatives. and to help parties become more responsive to their party members and
the electorate in general.;6 The programme faced strong opposition from the Democracy
Working Group (DWG) based in Morocco. made up orus Embassy. USAID and US
Consulate Slaff. The DWG felt Morocco's parliament and panies were highly ineffective
and unlikely candidates for democratic reform. NO! appealed directly to the State
llJoonsOll and Deane. CoruultatioJ1S with Moroccan Politico! Ponies. p.].
J.llbid.p.17.
;Slbid. Appendix VI.
~aliol1ill Democratic InSlilUle for International Affairs. CEPPSIND/ Quanerly Report.
"Morocco: Enhancing Legis/at;"e and Political Party Capacity. .. USAID Cooperati.-e Agr....ment No.
.-IEP-5-/68-A-()()"50J8-00. (Washington. DC: National Democratic InSiitute for International Affairs. 2000).
p.l.
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Depanmem and made the case for a parliamentary and political pany programme. in
commst to the expressed priorities - civic education in particular. of the US missions at
work in the country..'1
My work in Morocco was also based on a programme designed and in part
undcn\'ay before my arrival. My mandate was to execute and complete the progra:T1me
that I inherited. develop stronger relations with the parliament and parties. and to
intensify our work. with new funding ifpossible. NDI was also hoping to improve
relations with the US Embassy and AID mission in Morocco. given opposite vie'Ns on
where best to conduct democratic development in Morocco. With the apparent slowing
in Yemen's democratization in late 1999. by my arrival Morocco displaced the former as
the Institutc's preferrcd programme in the region. and was seen as the leading transition.
even model. for the Middle East and Maghreb region.';'
By the time of my arrivaL NDI's previous programme was concluding and a new
programme was in place with a budget ofUS$300.000: $200.000 for political pany
programmes and SI00.000 for parliamentary work. The latter budgct allocation was
initially conceived as a onNhird contribution to an NDI-UNDP-Chamber of
,;7Conversations with NO! Staff. Washington. March 1999; staff: Morocco. April 1999. and US
Embassy and USAlD officials. Rabat. Morocco. summer. 1999. NO! Sfaff in Morocco also lobbied the
prime minister 10 write a leneT to NOI in Washington, lauding the Institute"s work and asking for funher
cooperation. l1Ie Ic:ner was actually intended to show the OWG that the Institute'S de<:ision to work with
parliament and patties was the right one. and that it was supported at th~ highesllevels ofgovemmenl.
Carother.; notes that USAID mission staffsee political institutes (like NOll as sacred cows be<:ause of their
political connections in Washington. as in this instance. Carother.;. Aiding DemocraC)' Abrood pp.2S8·2S9.
';'Progr<Jmme de ren[orCt!ment des par/is polilique au M<Jra<:. p.l.
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Representatives programme. equally funded in thirds. Unfonunatcly whatcver agreement
or interest that had existed on the part of the parliament (and ultimately the UNOP) had
disappeared by my arrh·al. NO! was left to conduct a one-year parliamentary programme
that was. practically speaking. one-third ofa larger programme.
Thc lack ofintercst was a warning: there was no will on the panoflhc
parliament to work with NOL On arrival Iattempted to meet parliamentary leaders-
including leading caucus chairs and the speaker of the parliament. After three weeks of
meetings with key NO! contacts. I had met just two parliamentarians. Attempts to obtain
other meetings failed. I was finally able to meet the Deputy Speaker only after six weeks
in the country. An aide in the prime minister's office designated to facilitate our work in
the country would be unavailable for my first three and a half months in the country.
Rcd flags had also been raised in NOl"s o....n documentation. An NO! repon on a
previous workshop with parliamentarians noted that attendance was ""limited" and
""sporadic:'J9 That same [epan said that Nor had received ""eager"' requests for technical
assistance from panies and members of parliamcnt during the 1997 consultations the
Institute had conducted. but only tme parliamentary members had actually been
consuhed..I(J The repon funher characterized the 1997 elections as "reasonably open."
notwithstanding the absence of a formal monitoring mission. the protests of Morocco
lONational DemlXmtic InstitUle for lntematiOllal Affairs. Mt'chonismsfQl' Impuwing Coru..'US <Jnd
C(J(l!i,'-on Coordin<JlionfQl' Governing C(J(l!ilion Memfwrs <JndCoucus Effl!Cl;"'enessfQl' Ihl! Opposif'-on
(Washington: NatiOllal Democl1l1ic Institute. May 1999). p.IS.
.l(Jl0hns0nandDealle. Comu/UI/ions. Appendix VI.
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political panies to the contrary. and the opinions of Morocco watchers. II
Nors glossing over ofproblerns in Morocco extended to reports on the country's
transition. A list of fourteen findings from a series of meetings conducled in Morocco in
1998 could have been gleaned from a Reuters press anicle. They included such
observations as: Yousouffi's appointment represented a major change in Morocco:
various 'sectors' lobbied for inclusion in the new cabinet; and. the effectiveness and
scope of the new parliament remains 10 be seen"~
Other findings were either untested assumptions or simply erroneous. including a
slatementlhat the political atmosphere among political elite was ·dynamic.' The political
atmosphere was anything but dynamic. The report also stated thaI legislative elections
scheduled for 2002 were already helping panics focus on topics of membership.
platfonn development and communications. Only by late 2001 were parties even
beginning to discuss election issues and their preparedness. Finally. it said that"in many
cases. the old [party)leadership..are gradually being replaced by younger. refonn-
llThese induded lhe ISliqlal party leader. Abbas AI·Fassi. wllo argued lhe de<::tiOfl results were
falsified (and presented NOl wilh documenlation to this dfe<::I). Fassi claimed lhallhc dection rigging had
denied the ISliqlal the plurality of seats and Ille control of IIIegovernmenI. AnOlherdissenting voice was
llial of Mohammed Hafid. head oflllc USFP youlh wing. Hafid disputcd lIis o"n win in llie 1997
parliamenlary elcctiOflS. He claimed anolher candidate had actually won. and lhat lhe InteriOl" Ministry had
falsified lhe results 10 give lhe USFP more stats. leading 10~ appointmenl ofUSFP party General
Se<:relary Yousouffi as Prime Minister. I met wilh Mr. AI·Fassi on April J. :WOO and ....illl Mr. Hafid on
Aprill8,2ooo.
~lNalionalD<mocratic InSlitule for Imernational AlTairs, Morocc:o Trip Reporf, (WashinglOn. OC:
National Democralic Inslilule for Imemalional Affairs. April (998). pp. 34.
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minded individuals:"') Moroccan political parties are almost without exception presided
over by sexagenarians and septuagenarians if not octogenarians. Other findings served
to qualify the report and the prospects of the parliament playing an effective legislative
role, They included the King's turn~around in restricting legislative authority to matters
of economics and cducalion. and the King's continued insistence of control over the
'sovereign' ministries of Foreign Affairs. Defense. Justice. and Interior.....
I quickly grew ambivalent about our ability to work in the country. and after four
months infonned NO! the Moroccans showed little enthusiasm for the Institute's efforts.
The warning signs continued. Repeated attempts to plan NO! programmes and seminars
met with rebuffs and deferrals. leaving the Institute ultimately simply to set dates and
plan the programme without parliament's agreement. trusting parliamentarians would
participate once the activities occurred. This did ultimately happen. but only after much
protest: l
The parliamentary programme I initially adopted called for three seminars. but
NO! reduced it to one seminar (for 'reporting' purposes this ..lias two seminars. held back
to back with the same speakers), These were conducted in the face of the opposition of
the parliamentary leadership and generally scant enthusiasm. including protests by the
~llbid. pA. In poinl of fact. I attempted to condUCI a party communications programme for !he
parties in late .2000. bUI no parties were inlerested (nol even panies in Ihe governmenl coalition).
.... lbid.pp.J-4.
~~On one occasion I sal in lhe Deputy Speaker's office in Rabat twO da}'S before a seminar he was
hosting. wilh a Member oflhe Australian parliament. and!he Deputy Speaker called from Easlern Europe!o
cancel the programme.
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sccretal)' general of parliament..... Nonetheless. the seminars conducted in parliamcm had
greater panicipation than any previous NOI activity with the parliament. and receivcd
positive reviews from participants. No one from the parliarnenull)" leadership anended.
Given the lack of interest in cooperating with NO!. it was fell a trip abroad for
key parliamentarians might stir interest in our work. build allies for future suppon. and
press the paims raised in the previous seminars. NDI therefore conducted a study
mission to the UK to visit the British Parliament. in cooperation with the British
Embassy. This was in the place of the third seminar proposed in the original programme.
but NOI made application to re-programme the funds.
The study mission included key caucus members from both the govemmem and
opposition including a depmy speaker. a former minister and opposition pany leader.
and one of only two women parliamentarians. Designed to emphasize themes raised in
the seminars in parliament. the programme was a success. judging from the enthusiasm
and participation of the members. Organized by the Foreign & Commonwealth Oflice.
the itinerary was well-designed. based in large pan on NDI recommendations.
Regrettably. the deputy speaker attended less than half the meetings.
Ultimately a will to reform appeared not to exist in parliament. and certainly no
will to work with NDI was evident. The ehamber is administratively comrolled by a
secretary general - verbally hostile to NDI· who was appointed directly by King
""Conversation with Parliamentaly Staff, Rabat. Morocco. November 2000.
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Hassan.~l Th~ current government controls parliament. and has no desire to see itself
challenged by it, while the opposition is mostly the fomler palace-aligned panies who
likcwise have little "iJllo refonn.
This is a fundamental criticism of aid programmes that is made by Carothcrs: Ihe
lack of perception and discemmenl ofwhelher a will to cooperate exists or is
forthcoming. Carothers says democracy aid practitioners. what has been called a
for.vard-operational focus modc. either fail 10 see or wilfully ig.nore such indicalors. That
shortcoming is serious. as the biggest obstacle in legislative development is, he writes,
"the pauciry of interest in refann among the main power holders in Ihe legislatures of
many transitional countries,,"'s
The lack of a proper legisl:ltivc assessment h:ld given NDlliule or no c:lpacily to
judge this or the actual needs of the parliament. Instc:ld, the Institute and its stafi'were
lelt to discover il on the ground after the programme had been conceived and funded.
Rheloric surrounding Ihe role and import of the legislature even slood in the face of a
democracy assessment conducted for USAID by an aC:ldemic consultant in the US who
had published extensively on Morocco, and Arab parliamentary development in
gencrnl.-l'l
HConversalion with NDI staff. Rabat. Morocco, April 2000 and February 2001.
~!CarotheB. Aiding De"'QC1'a~)' Abroad. p. 183. Carothers wnlt'S ~lfleadeB have scanl inleresl in
reforming ltle major stale inslilulions...[legislalive strenglhening] is unlikely to achieve noleworthy mullS.-
p.JOti.
-l'lDcnocux. DemocnJCY .~.I.1e.l.l",ellt o/Morocco and Baaklini ct. al.. Legi.llatiH! Politics ill the
Arab World.
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Ultimately. I completed the year in Morocco. conducting our progmmmes with
parliament in the face of opposition. and planned for new programmes as the Institute
opted to remain. Notwithstanding the lack of enthusiasm from parliamentarians and
particularly the leadership. the lnstitute's parliamentary seminars featured higher
participation and 'programme activity' than the Institute's previous t\\'o years in the
country. due in part to our willingness to push ahead in the face of the lack of interest.!(I
Comparing the two cases. Yemen possessed a measure of will but little capacity:
Morocco possessed great capacity. but no will. In neither case were the programmes
conducted on the basis ofa systcmatic study of the democratic openings occurring. nor
were initial or follo\\'-on programmes the result of detailed assessments of the
legislatures the programmes were intended to aid. The Institute's work relied on the core
strategy of democratization that assumes strong legislatures simply matter.
A 'right' reading or analysis of the transitions underway in Yemen and Morocco
would have led to different approaches in both countries. As the Yemeni parliament had
some power and was more apt to use it (to stall the budget, for example). it would have
made sense to work more closely with it, and not panics. In Morocco, with a parliament
that can not maner, NOI should have adopted USAIO's arguments for civil society.
~Dl Morocco's party programmes faced similar challenges. Nonetheless we conducted over 20
programmeserninars. including over 400 participants. Fundingdoubted,andasecondfieJdrepresenlati\'e
was hired. NDI's work 'succeeded' (measured by semilliUS and participants) through sheer belligerence on
NDl's part in extending our programmes to new members and repeating them more frequentl)' (including on
occasion outside the Rabat·Casablanca comdol). and by by·passing party eliteswhodemonstr:ltedlinleor
no will to coopernte.
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As Baaklini. Denoueu.'( and Springborg notc. fWlctioning. capable Icgislatures
"can do liule of consequence in the absence of a broader democratic dispensation....·· and
poorly less endowed lcgislaturescan make impact when they have more centrality. but
lcss capacity." The distinction is important. As Melia ....Tites. "Thc more 'central' a
legislature is to the governance ofa counuy. the more powerful it is. 'Capacity' refers to
those attributes thai detennine the extent to which parliaments actually fill the available
political space: from the political will of parliamentaJ1' leaders. to the organization' s
structure and procedures:'s:
NDl's approach to legislath'e development in both Yemen and Morocco made
assumptions of centrality (in Yemen and Morocco) and capacity (in Morocco). but did
not properly assess those in reality. A careful reading of the transitions underway. and
the history and role of the legislatures in thcm. was missing.
SI Me1ia.Review.p.2.
s:Jbid.p.2.
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Chapter" - Critical Assessmenl of tbe Lilerature
In 1970 a volume on comparative legislatures began with the warning ··...a
notable lacuna involves thc placc oflegislalive assemblies in the development of
political systcms. "1 The same lacWla cxists 30 years latcr in respect of legislati\'e
assemblies in the latest wave of transitioning democracies. Packenham. writing in the
mid-seventies. said that e\'cn where studies were conducted of legislatures. they were
focused on the US Congress. and that the most imponant questions regarding lcgislati\'c
activity. particularly in tenns of its impacts on the rest ofa particular political system.
were essentially Wlstudied.: More recently. a prolific examiner of new legislatures \\TOte
··... the variables associated with the legislative institution - how it is internally structured.
what procedures it adopts. how it transacts ilS business. what resources are available to
the various political actors· are topics rarely explored by either scholars or
poliqmakers.-J
That in itselftentalivcly confinns one of the key contentions oflhis thesis: that
1Allan Kornberg and L1o~-d D. Musolf. -on LegislalUm in Developm~ntal Pe~li\'e.··
L<'gis/(l/u,~s in D.!l·~/op"'t!nta{ p~,sp!!cliw. ed. Allan Kornberg and Lloyd D. Musolf, (Durham: Duke
Univenit)! Press. 1970). p.J. The authors add lhal ...rilers on compar31ive polilics had only jusl besun 10
consid~'f"polilicaldevelopmentasapbenomenon.
:Robert A. Packenllam. "Legislatures and Polifical D.:vdopmenC Lt!gis{atuNs in Dcwfop"'t!n/(l{
Pt!rJper:tr.·~.p.5.:!1.
lAbdoI. Baaklini.-LegislatureSlrUclureandConslilulional Viability in Socitties Undergoing
D.:mocralic Transilion:' D~sigrl'fQl"Ck",ocratic Stability: Studi!!! in nab/!! elmslililtiona/is", tArmonk.
NY: ~tE. Sharpe. 1997). pp. 1.:!7-1.:!8. As wilh him. so wilh me: -II is be>'ond die scope of this lwork) to
address lhe enlire rangeofinuesassocialed"ilhlhe Iegislaliveinslirulion build ingrc:quiredforaslablc
democl'1l.1icregime.-p.128.
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there is a gap between practice and theory: which \\ill be considered later, between
acadcmically·grounded understandings of legislatures in new democracies and the
practice oflegislative development or strengthening, My focus bridges Ihese IWO
understudied subjects. The caveat remains: while democracy aid has grO\\ll extensively
it remains both "understudied and poorly understood...j
In considering the academic literature concerning legislative political
de\'elopment assistance in transitioning and consolidating democracies. we face two
questions. The first concerns the role and impact of legislatures in transitions. The
second concerns what kind of democracy assistance is being or should be olTered to new
legislatures (in new democracies). On the first. little has been written: on the second.
even less again.~ But first. a briefretlcction on legislalUres in general.
~ForaconsiderationofthegapbetwunrftelOricandpruclkeinthemlKhbroad(rconle.'tof
American foreign polk)'. see Jason G. Ralph H'High Stakes' and ·Low·lntensit).· Democracy':
Understilllding America's Policy of Promoting Democracy,· .~m<!r;(<ln D<!mcx:r<l<}' PromOliof/., pp..!OO·211.
lCarothers• .~;Jing D.tmocr<lCY Abroad. p.g. Even within Ihe fietd of practitioners. the 'forward
operallonal foc~s' is observed. As a large caveat In the NOI G~idcbook for Implementing Legislative
Programmes admits. -This book addresses only one part of the legislative de\'Clopment wort. (sicl project
implementation. The decisioo of whether 10 engage in such projects in a panicular country ilIId the design of
such projects is made by different people at different points in lime. The review of that procC'SS is left for
another day.· [page ii] That review will be moS! valuable, and could contr'ibule 10 bener implementation.
6a .R. Boynton and ClIong Lim Kim. "Introduction:' Lfigis/aln'<! S}'$I<!m$ in D ......doping COllnlrifi1.
Ells. G.R. Bo>nton and Chong Lim Kim (Dwham: Duke UnivetSity Press. 1975). p.15. Boynton and Kim
nOte that while knowledge of westem legislatures is limited. "it is very considerable "-hen compared with
our knowledge oflegislarures inotherp3TtSoftheworld.~Reasons that they suggest Include; the
requirementtoobtainageneralunlkrstandingofdevelopingcounuiesbeforefocusing on their kgislarures:
that legislatures in del/eloping countries were deemed unimponant [thereby begging the question?l.
ineffectual and thereby ignored: and thai legisla1UreS were unsuble. Joseph LaPalombara notes the woli;is
an achievcment ..... in view of the paucity of even the most elementary information we may wish to havc
about Icgislativc bodies:' J. Blonde!. Comparalil'" Legi1/alure1 (Englewood Cliffs: Prenticc·Hali. 1973).
p.x.
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Legislatures can matter. They are often the lirsl inslitutions disbanded after
military coups, can serve as forums for disput~ and contrO\'ersy to generate opposition to
executive branches, and are enlry-channels for the recruitment of new elites who often
challenge old ones.' As one academic \\TOte.
A~riousl~gislatureisaprincipal:lrenaofpoliticalaction.ltdocsthejobitwas hired to
do (oradtrnocTllC> i(it isappropriattl}'organize<l. informed andrnotivattd: whcre: it
aCl$asachet:ktothet.~et:uti\·e .... ithoutbeinganimmovabltobstacltblockingthtwa>'
to action: "htn it represenl$ thc ,'arieTyofthcpopulalion ....ithali ofil$ oppositions and
contradictions \llIilt ~'et providin~ the means for thtir resolution.s
The basic functions of legislatures can be summarized as legislation.
accounlability. representation and conflict management.9 In minimal fegislatllrt's - such
as in trarlsitioning and new democracies· those functions are perceived as more limited:
propose, enact. study and revise were som~ of the tenns suggested by Thai legislatOrs in
a study in 1971.10 This "ill be considered in more detail later. but in sum these
functions serve to mitigate against the control of the executi\'e - ..".resistance 10
'Bo~lIton and Kim ··lntroducTion.- L<'gisl<1,;...~S...st~ms. p.19. TheauthClr'S rcftr{O Gat)' Hoskin's
,,011.; on the Columbian legislature and recruiunent ofnt\\" ~lilts in th~ 19305. ~I<:uy. Goodman and
Hopkins corroborate this in thtir respective studies ofThailand. South Vietnam and Ken}'3. Reprding
disbanding. ~Ie~ty "Tiles - ...a determined anernp( {on the part of the Thai parliamenl in 1971 r to influence
publicpolicyintbism:mn~rrpolilicallyl'C'Sponsivelcancrealetbeconditionsforthecl~oflhc
legislature b>' the Go,·emmtnt.- Micha~1 L. M~zt}·,-~ Functions ofa Minimal Legislature: Role
Perctptions of Thai Legislator\,- Westt'rll Poli/ical Qaart",I.\' ~5A (December 1972). p.700.
'Marrin C. N.:edkr. -Conclusion: The Ltgislarur.: in a D.:mocratic Lalin America.- Lt'gisla/uro's
amI/he S ....· Demor;fadt's in L<1lin Amaic<1. ed. Da\'id Clost (Boulder: L}1lIIt RienneI' Publisher'S, (995).
p.158.
'OJ"id Close, "lntnXluction: Consolidaling Democracy in Latin American - \\'hat Role for
Ltgislatures- Legis/alures and /ht' S""· D"mor:rar:ies in La/ill.~meficQ. pp.1-4.
1QMelCY, -The Functions of a Minimal L.:gislanJTC::' p.692. Such institulions. and their legislaTOrs.
rartl}'pcrcei\cthemseh'escapableoforresponsibkfor-indepcndentSfUdyandsifiingofallemativeptlblic
policyproposals,-
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absolutism and lyr.Ulny...· - and to provide a measure of citizen input into govemment. 11
But if legislatures malter. how. why. to what degree. and to whom they malter
vanes \\idely depending on the political system in which they operate. The US Congress
is perhaps Wlique among legislatures. Most only vet laws. ensure some measure of
accountability of the executive (a task increasingly performed by a free press. and civil
society). represent constituents and serve as ombudsmen for government functions. and
vent contlictldebate. as noted above. They are not the principal creators of legislation or
policy.'~ Most parliaments are often relegated to a symbolic role when it comes to their
input in policy making. It may even be thal they only mailer simply because they exist.
pl!1I imporrt! what they do. U
One significant contribution to the literalure on legislatures is Blondel's
Comparatint Legislatures. published in 1973. The book was an attempt to revive the
study of legislatures. and alTers a comparative review of legislatures in both democratic
and nondemocratic regimes. It does not however consider their role in transition and
IIClos.:,"lnlTOduelion...-.pA_5.
I~Close. "lnlJoduetion:' pp.2-4. In "is concluding article in the s.:une volume. M:utin C. Need[er
[istsseven functions· tegis[ate. [egitimize.e[e<:t{asele<:toraleollege fore.'e<:uti,·cs),monitor,edueatellle
public.socialixellr.linpoliticians.andconstirueneyservicing{includingmedialion/ombudsmanftmctionl
(pp.15-4-155). In general. as Bo}ntonand Kim II.Tite. M.,.the relative ineffectiveness of the legis laruresin
exercising influence on policy maners within lIIcir political systems" is velY real. Boynton and Kim,
"lntroduction,"p.11.
IJKomberg and Musolf suggest something similar: even where [egislatures are facades. it may be
lIIallhey will de.-elop into somellling else later. ''00 legislatures in Developmental Perspeo;live,- p.~9 S~
aiM) David Olson, -P3r.1doxes of lnstitulional [)eve[opmenl; The Ne.... Democralic Parliaments ofCenlr31
Europe:' r",..malional PoIi/iCIJ.{ Sci.mce R",·iO!M·. 18, -I ([997); -401416.
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consolidation. l • Nonetheless it is a valuable contribution. As Blondel writes. the topic is
important: "legislatures (or assemblies. or parliaments) pose perhaps the most
fascinating problem ofall structures ofgovernment. for they have been and continue to
be both the most decried and the most revered. the most hoped for and often the least
successful institution in contemporar:' gO\'emment:' ll
Slondel says some of the difficulties facing legislatures are their comparative
lack of strength in the face of other institutions. particularly the executive. and their
relative ineffectiveness and inconsistency deriving from their eternal debating and
squabbling. Yet their faults belie a certain resiliency: when shut. they spring back: whcn
maligned. they endure. 16 The paradox of weakness and resiliency. he says. is explained
in matching the rhetoric oflegislative functions as descri~d abo\'e to a more restricted
reality. bridging the 'form' and the reality.17
The ··a.xiomatic·· ideal oflegislath'e functions. daling from the seventeenth
century. was held 10 be la\\making: executives ruled the country. but legislatures made
the rules. II legislatures ultimately could therefore contribute 10 liberal democracy in
several ways: first. the executive would be limited to acting in accordance with the will
I·BlondeJ. Comparal;\'e L"gis/alures. p.\i. The work is dated and democratization as a
subdiscipline was hardlydcl'etoped.
Il1bid p.:!.
1&[bidp.3
nlbidp.3
Illbid p...l.
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ofpeople·s representatives: second. the general rules of society would have the general
:lpproval of the population. via the people·s representatives: and third. such legislatures
would be thc only practical means - direct democracy being impractical - to control the
cxccutive. ,q
A decline in the centrality or significance of the role of legislatures created
disappointment in the f:lce of such high hopes. That disappointment had three sources.
including the general decline of legislatures stemming from the ··indictment of members
ofassemblies:' pressure from executives. and complicated nation31 questions that
stressed representatives and impacted on their will. A second source of disappointment
in legislatures stemmed from the rise of rubber-stamp legislatures in the Soviet Union
and other dictatorships. where assemblies were "parodies" of true legislative bodies.:oIn
Third World states rubber.stamping was matched by a decorative role. The third source
ofdisillusionment related to legislatures that were held in check by strong party
discipline and the 'fiats of strong executives·· that backed them.: 1
But again. legislatures prove resilient in the face ofdisappointments. Blondel
notes that in the 138 countries in existence at the time of his work. only five never had a
legislature. Only thirty were then without one. and among those four were in fonnalion
lqlbid. p.S. Close "rites-T",o of the five general functions ofa political1ysignificnnllegisl.uure
meril special anenlion in relalion lodemocrati:tation:· conlroJling lhepolilicalexeeulivenndproviding
representalion ofcitizen interests. Close. ~JnlrOduclion ~ in Legisla/ures and the Ne.... D.!mocrades. p.5.
::Olbid.p.6.
!I[bid p.6.
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and four others were deemed to be temporary.:: Where they were dispensed with. they
were eventually reinstated. albeit in vaf)°ing fonns (sometimes because rulers needed the
legitimization that comes y,;th having a legislature. or they were disbanded with the
desire to reform them). In shon. ··Some sort of natural law seems to force leaders of
modem politics sooner or later to create legislature3 or to be ovenhrown and replaced by
men who wilL in tum. create an assembly. The idea of the legislature is thus
inherently...resilient:·:J Add to this. as Carothers writes. the hope. the ·-...underlying
assumption...that more competent. efficienllegislatures - whether part of democratic
systems or not· would further the economic and social development of Third World
countries.'·:'
The question of hVIr legislatures matter. though. is a contentious one. as captured
in Obler·s "Lcgislatures and the Survival of Political S)Ostems: A Review Anicle:·:~ In it
he examines the study of legislatures in the discipline of political science in the 1970s.
He suggests that academics obsessed \\;th trying to show legislatures matter without
giving real evidence. and concludes with a damning statement thai the ·fate of nations'
::lbidp.8.
:J1bid, pp. 8-9. At the time ofpublicarion (191) apparently only Cuba. Bunna. Syria and Iraq had
been without parliamental}· bodies for at least a decade. Kornberg and Musolfsuggesl "The reason why
legislalive inslitutions e.d1ibit such regenerative powerl;. in our view. is thai they are perceivC'd by thos.e who
aspire 10 po"er or already' have tesred ilasa legilimizing force. as a naessaryCondilionformainlainingnol
only themsc:lves but also a given otder. regardless ofilS fOllTl or objectives:' Kornberg and Musolf. ·"On
legislatureS in Developmental Penpeclive." Lt!gi$I<Jfur~s in O<:wlopmenral Pfflp.'clil"e. po28.
:·Carotherl;. Aiding o.:mocra,,· Abroad. p.2·t
:1Jeffi"ey Obler. -legislatures and the Survival of Political S)·slems: A Review Anicle.- Po/ilical
xienceeuurter(1"96.1 {Spring 1981).pp. 121-I~O.
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simply does not rest on parliaments.;~ He goes on to say:
Th.:y (academicsl grope for ways in which lhl.'lcgislative process affects the eapacityo(
political sy'stemsto survive. And the links lhey find are. too ol\en. tenuOllS artd
remote ....itcanbcarguC'dtha!-comparalivclegislaf\lresMasasubfield ..illa!lllphyas
long as its primary mission is 10 eslablish that kgislaf\lres have a subswllial impact on
politicallifl.'....If we are 10 care about legislalures. we mUSI do so (or a reason: w( mUSI
sho.":thal what le!ti~laturesdo is lied to iSSlll.'S artd values other than thc sW"Vivalof"",.
polillcalsy·slem....-
Obler is \\Tong.1 think. in an imponant respect. The question of whether
legislatures contribute to or detract from the viability of political systems is itself
imponant. This is particularly true in transitional and consolidating democracies. el"/m if
whal legis/atl/res do is ofno concern to Ihe people in Ihe streelS. Legislative
development occurs in this very context. and simply means: working to assist legislati\·e
institutions in nascent democracies. ~auseof the assumption. grounded or otherwise.
that it is imponant. Obler himself conct.'dcs this at one point that the study of legislatures
should explore how they impact on ··... the preservation of representative democracy...or
the erosion of authoritarian rule...:. Legislati\·c dC"e!opmcnt assumes legislatures do
indeed have impacts of this nature.
The role of legislatures in transitions· while not studied extensively - enters into
the equation here. For example. Altita Agh has \\Titten that parliaments in Easl Central
:·lbid.p.13S.
:1Ibid.p.13S.
:'Obler. ·Legislalurcsand lheSl1n,ivalofPolilicat Systems: p.139
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European have been key in democratic transitions.:I' He suggests five functions that
impact directly on democratic transition and consolidation:
l. The legis/oli\'efimcrion,..above all in the constitution-making process.
that is, the esublishment of the basic rules of the political game for the
whole transition and for the consolidation of democracy.
2. The comrollingfimction. in which the parliament ...has balanced the
executive in order 10 prevenl the rise ofa new power monopoly.
3, The conflicl managemenlfimclion. which has been particularly
imponant in the period of deep socio-economic crisis associated \\ith
democratic transition, The transition has been accompanied by acute
conflicts...[t]herefore".parliaments ha\'e had to be the major means of
conflict resolution. It is also unavoidable that the parliaments have becn
the central targets of all mass protests and demonstrations.
4. The soda/izolionfimction, involving the schooling ofthc new elite
after its recruitment process by providing an 'arena' for its 'natural
selection' and establishing the rule of'parliamentarized' elite behaviour.
5. The legilimulionfimclion can be regarded as the most essential onc in
the first period of the democratic transition, since the young democracies
have emerged from a legitimacy gap or vacuum and badly need a strong
legitimation dcvice, Parliament as a cenlro.! site provides a forum for the
major political actors and the mutually legitimize themselves and the ne""
democratic order, The creation of a parliamentary framework for
democracy should facilitate at the same time the building ofa bridge
between the parties and ordinary citizens in the forum of a social and
political dialogue, in and through the parliamenl.><J
:I'Anila Agh, "ParliamenlS ilS Policy-making Bodies in EilSt Central Europe: The CilSC of
HlIllgary:'/nternOfiOflol Politico/Science Rl!Vie... 18. <I (1991), pAl1,
>0Altila Agh, The Politi4"$ o!Cem,o{ £u,ope (London: Sage Publications. 1998). p.93·94. Re: the
socialization function, Morocco's parliament is ignored by society ingenel'al,anindicat~ofilS
m:lf'ginaliution, Yemen's patliament. on the othtr hand, is often the scene OfpmtC'SlS and demonstrations
The legitimation facfor should play mon: imo NDl"s wort.
-71-
Parliaments in East Central European and the Balkan region have. he adds. been
the most imponant institutions in the democmtization process in that region?1 Yet he
concedes they were weakened by institutional and cultural deficits. The inslilUtional
deficit is 'formulated' by immatun: political panies represented in the parliament. and
missing systems and procedun:s. which Agh calls "half-made internal parliamentary
institutions:':;: A focus on internal systems and procedures features in some ofNOrs
work. and could ha\'e proved successful in Yemen where internal rules were ignored and
by-passed.
The cultuml deficit, he says. is more problemalic and larger. II also captures more
public anention. Agh defines it as behavioural. and faults the clites in new parliaments
who manifest undemocratic behaviour and thereby undermine the new parliaments. in
effect delegitimizing them and making them unpopular.
There are at least three causes for this. First. elites want to inslitutionalize their
O\\Tl parties and demobilize the masses. such that politics remains remote and alien to
the general population.H Second. eliles engage in obscure political and ideological
debates that distance parliament from practical socio-cconomic issues. Third. new elites
practice zero-sum games of political competition. and fail to practice compromise and
;1 1bid.p.89.
J:1bid,p.90.
:;;lbid.p.90.
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consensus-oriented behaviour. furthering hindering parJiamentat}· development.;'>
More generally. parliaments in transition \\ill only inadequately fulfill the
essential functions. They remain half-made institutions. \\ith low efficiency and lacking
the required internal workings. They have contrndictory rules and procedures. and otien
rush poorly drafted bills into law which then require subsequent amendments or
revocations. H Such inadequale performances serve to further undermine parliaments in
transitional democracies. and possibly the transitions themsel\·es.
Olson also writes about a number of institutional paradoxes that amict
parliaments in new democracies. paradoxes resulting from a larger one which he calls
thc opportllnity-capabilil}· gap. the ultimate paradox of new parliaments. \\ith increased
demand or opportunity for action but reduced capacity to po;:rform.)o Olson goes on to
say that parliaments are critical bodies in the determination afthe shape of policy and
politics in transitional democracies.;1 But the problems parliaments face impede their
ability to contribute adequately to institutionalizalion. in particular in respect of their
"'lbioipp.90-91.
3~lbid. p.9.t
3&0I$On. MParadoxcs of InsIi WIionat Dc,·clcpmcrll: .•:·. pA02. The six paradoxes are: (I) new
members in oUlmoded facilities: (2) the move from single part). 10 multi·party S)'SIcms: (3) ncw connicts
andoldrules:{..()commineesassttucturesofcxfl('ftiseandpo",er,{S)theexecutivcpuzzlcof"l!resident.
cabinct. and partiament'·: and (6) the active parliamem and the disbelieving public.
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policy-making and related functions,;1 The study of that subject is still inadequate,
Elections and broad democratization questions have occupied most research
while the observation of the institutionalization process of new democratic parliaments
has gone unexamined.;q The place and fUf1ction of legislatures is certainly not settled. but
if legislatures matter in transitions. then helping del'clop them will matter as wei!.""
Enter legislative development.
Legislative development is but one component of democracy aid. The latter is
simply the efTon 10 aid institutions. processes and principles." It includes training.
technical assistance. conceptual education. and practical ad\"ice and sharing of
experiences.~: legis!ati\'e aid is defined more specifically. by NDllor example. as the
attempt to ··... foster representati,·e. transparent (open). competent. and accountable
JIAgIl. -Parliaments as Polie>'-maJdng Bodies. pA:!9-U I. Agh suggests it is small ,omfort in the
facl th:u inadequacies of parliaments I'is-a-vis poli,y making oc,urs in the pal"liaments ofad"an'ed
democr.1des. perhaps be<:ause he ,ails parliaments Lhc "first really demOl:r3lized inSlilulion.-
l'IOlson, "Par<ldoxes of Institulional Developmenl:' pA13.
-IODavid Olson. [).>mocT(;l/icLegis/ll/;'..e flulituliom:.~ Campara/h'c l"ie.... (New York M.E.
Sharpe,I99.j).p.IO.
~ICarothers. .~idingD.!mocra,,· .-Ibroad. p.,'ii. DemOl:r.1C)· aid has been -Variously ,ailed
democr.KY assistan,e. democT1lc)'-related assiSWlU. demoI:T1Icy promotion. politi,,,l aid. polilkal
assistance, poli(i,al development aid. and support for demOl:r::tli, developmenl.- Burnell. ··OcmOl:r.1'y'
Assistan'e: The Slate of the DiscOllJ>e:' pA. So:e also Gordon Crawford. For-eign .-lid and Poliliclll
Refor-m: .-I Campllrllliw Analysis ofDemocro~' Assisl<Jncellnd Polilicol Condilionalify(New YorS;:;
Palgrave,100llforanoverviewoflbecriliqueofpolititalaid
~:CMO{hers,MTakinS Slack ofDemoc:-racy Abrood,M American Demacrocy Promotion. p.IQl.
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legislatures:"> The goal is to make legislatures more responsive and active, both \'is-a-
vis the electorate and the executive.
Legislative development works on the premise that legislatUfCs matter and that
they ean actually bo: 'contributed to' or strengthened, Practitioners have made these
assumptions independent. it seems. of the literature. relying on either intuition or their
experience 'at home.' Aid practitioners like NDI tum to legislative de\'c1opment
because their own experience with a strong congressional model reinforces assumptions
of the potential of an effective parliament in a new polity.... Practitionen therefore work
....ith parliaments because they think they are key institutions that will actually produce
change.
Legislative aid to parliaments abroad can also develop goodwill for the US.
building relationships between Congress and parliaments worldwide. Legislalh'e aid is
also an casy sell to Congress. the final source of appropriations for legislative and indeed
all political development aid.'l Shapiro and Macedo write that ,·[t might be widely
accepted that democracy is a good thing. )'CI it is equally apparent that democrats have
·'National Democnuic [nstitule for International Affairs, G"iJ..boolr./or Implementing L.'gisl<1fn·e
Programmes (Washington: Nalional Ikmocratic [n5lilUle for Internalional Affairs, !OOOl, p, 3.
"'Carothers. Aiding De",ocruq' Abroad, pp.I77·]78. This siems parlly from !he COfe Slrillegy and
modeL focusing on inslilUlions !hat donorsareexperienced .. ilh 'ill home.'
~SCaro!hers. Aiding DemQCruq' ,~broaJ. p. 178. For example, NO] included Jim Dyer,lead
Republican slalTrnember oflhe House: of Representalive's Approprialions Comminee in an eleclion
mission 10 Yemen in ]991. r lalervisiledhim in Congress 10 updale him on our ...orkabrwd.
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much work to do in improving the perlormance of democratic institutions,''''' It is
precisely this help that democratic aid aims at giving.
Springborg, who specializes on legislatures in the Arab world and is therefore
especially relevant to this thesis, ch:lr.lcterizes legislative development as strengthening
the suppl)' side of the democratic equation,
An appropriate str.!tegy oflcgislative devclopment sllould rcslon tile proposition thai
legislaturcssllouldbcvirallinksorlr.lnsmissionbcltsbcl\O"ccncivilsocieryand
government. The process of who gtlS _lIal. wlltn and 11011' in democnllic political
s}~tcm, consisU of thl'ff sttps. First. demands are articulated and aggregated in civil
society. SKond,tllcse demands are processed by legislarurcs into public policy. Finally.
uccutiveburcaucracics implement these policies under regislativeover;ighl. Each of
these three functions is an appropriate target for inslitutional capacilJi buirding.~'
While Springborg seems to be saying that legislative developmem strategy should focus
on legislatures as links between civil society and government, hc also suggests that
stimulating the demand side of the political cqll3tion raises the expectations of the
electorate in systems already challenged by unmet demands. To conduct 'internal'
legislative strengthening on the capacity of parliaments to function. on the other hand. is
to strengthen the ability of fonnal political institutions to 'respond' as opposed to
helping ...civil society. for example to articulate or make demands. ~I NDI adopted this
.It>lan Shapiro and Stephen Macedo. "Introduction:' Cksig'ling Democr<Jfic Insriwfirms, p.l. This
volume looks at the imponant question ofho... democratic principles work or fail. and -how to improve the
dcsignsofdemocr:uic institutions." p.l. It doesnol, however. consideritin the context oflr.lnsitionalor
consolid3tingdemocracies.
HRobcn Springborg. "Legislative Development as a Key Element ofStnllegies for
Democr.uization in the Arob World.- ArabSlUdies Journal (Spring 1995). p.97. Emphasis added.
~sSpringborg, 'Legislative Developmnt", p.96,
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overly simplistic and Americemric language in Morocco in particular. in making its case
to USAID and the State Department. two of the Institute's main funders. about the focus
ofour work there. NDI was keen to work with the parliament, or the supply side of the
political system. whereas the funders preferred to work with civil society and NGOs. i.e.
the demand side.~Q
Springborg makes several arguments for developing supply versus demand: he
says that supply will work to help development appropriate demands: that supply is an
easier form of political development for practitioners: that supply is policy neutral
whereas demand is generally not (supply is not inherently about content, but rather
systems and processes (unlike demand); and finally. supply is less threatening to host
governments. whieh are reluctant to increase or heed demands made on them.!O
Writing in 1970. two academics noted that "at every step of the way...hypotheses
must be tested against actual situations and their relevance checked through the close
association of scholars and practitioners:'l' That same caution still stands, apparently
unheeded. Indeed some would argue that legislative development can hinder a new
polity's progress: legislatures may even resist change in a country undergoing
~QNordldthls·una""11J'es·oftheSpringborgargumenl.bulraltlerbasedonllSO"'TlinIUIlion. Vela
more careful assessmem in Morocco woold have shown the ro:verse was INe lhere.
IOSptingborg."LegislativeDcvelopment:'p.96.
llUoyd D. Musolfand Fed W. Riggs. "Comparalive Legislative Studies and S<:rvices: Notes for a
Programme:' l.egislalllr..s in DI!1,'elopmmlal Pl!rspecfi..... p.503.
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lIansition.~! This is often ignored by practitioners. Three additional functions that
require careful consideration in the context of legislative development aid - rarely
broached. and certainly not thoroughly examined - are presented in papers in the volume
Legis/alive Systems in Dc\'e/vping Countries: gOrll-setting, conflict management. and
integration in a given polity. ··... the legislature as a goal-setting agency for society. the
legislature and the managemenl of conflict and the role played by the legislature in the
integration of the polity.lJ These issues should feature in legislalive assessments,
Most academics. as Boynton and Kim note, assume legislatures are important,
and then proceed to study the internal organization and workings.}' That assumption of
importance occurs among practitioners of legislative aid as well (along with the focus on
specifie or technical aspects oflcgislatures), divorced from larger questions. The details
of structure, membership. or operations are studied. but how such details p13y out in a
consolidated or functioning legislature ....ill not be the same in a new legislature,ll An
improved strategy for consideration suggested by the authors would include questions
about what a given legislature does and how it matters in a given polity and system.
IlPakcnham. ~lcgisl<ltLlJ'n and Political DcvclopmenC p.2. For cX<lmple. did the premature:
conduct ofetections b<tjrmoheirrime in Yemen in 1993 contributc to the civil war which followed?
IJBo)l1lonand Kim. p.27.
}llbid,p.27
ISrbid.p.27.
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based on new concepttulJizations and difterent data and analysis. SfI Another question
they raised was the role of legislatures in contributing to the stability (or durability) of
political systems. Obviously a relevant question for legislatures in transitions. but one
aboul which practically nothing is knO\\1I. 17
Baaklini examines two additional and fundamental challenges relevant to the
work oflegislatures in tmnsitions. The first challenge is reconciling Ihe functioning of
the legislative body with Ihe executive. and avoiding impasses that often arise in
presidential systems where the powers are separale. The second challenge is ensuring
Iha! political parties play within the system (especially smaller parties that pla)'l-d
'outside the rules of the game during authoritarian times), through incentives to be pan
of the legislative process.ll
One of the cemea[ features ofa legislature in a presidemial system is its role in
policy-making.l~ When such assemblies are weak. it is because they have little or no
capacity 10 either adeqtultely study or consider policy issues. and certainly no capacity to
make their 0\\11 substantial recommendations.60 While the policy influence of
Sfl1bid, p.:!? This is similar 10 whal Carolhers suggests in his lalesl wort. Pructilioners ask c1ose-
ended questions like "How is the democrutizatiOll process going'!' ...hen they should be asking opc!l-ended
questions like -What is happening here politically?- Thomas Carothers. -The End of the Paradigm.-
Ja~rn(J' a[Democracy 13. I (January 2002), p.IS,
17Bo)11IonandKim.p.27.28.
~IBaak!ini. "Legis!alurcSlNcIUfe3lldConstilulional Viability,"p.I:!8.
~9lbid p.Dt.
60 lbid p.l3!.
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legislatures in parliamentary s)'stems is low - and the control the e:"ecutive exercises
over them more problematic - iegislatures and cenainly individual members nonetheless
need research and study capacities.~' A proposal was made for a parliamemary research
cenue for the Moroccan chamber of representatives. supponed for once by the
parliamentary leadership and the UNDP. but NDI opted not to do il.~! This was
notwithstanding the Institute's own recommendations to parliamem following a series of
NDI seminars in October 1999. In a memo developed by the two intcrnational trainers
who had panicipated in those seminars. they "{proposed] the elaboration ofa three pan
programme to strengthen the legislative drafting capacity of the Chamber of
Representatives...:~J which would in tum have helped members in analyzing and
critiquing legislation in general.
instead. a programme previously executed in Namibia was substitutcd. on the
~1"Tohclplhe legislalurclogainpublielruSl...il mustha\·clheC3pacitYloeondoclrcscarch.gcr
inform.llion.lhccapabilityloanalyzclhcinformalionlhatilgatocrsandin facl. il mUSI havc a strong
information bar.e for n:sean:h aoo analysis. IOtheNiiscl ... il is not ablelocffecrivclyreprrscntecnainisStlcs
lhal arc crilicallO lhe nation." Rematts by Dr. Baffour Agyema·Ouah. Associale Exccutive Direelor.
Ccnler for Democracy and Developmenl in Ghana.;U lhe Emerging Democracies Forum. held in Sana·a.
Yemen. National o...'ITlocratic Institule for Inlemafional Affairs. NOI Workshop Report. Emerging
Democracies Forom (Washinglon. DC: Nalional DemocT:llie Institule for Internalional Affairs, (999).
URl: hup:/fwww.ndi.orglcdflfranscriptslbpt_room2l5.hrml
62This slemmed in part from previous complical ions in obtaining UNOP programme suppan. NDI
was reluctant 10 try again. despite an agreement OfCoopcT:llion signed in New York in July 2000. URL:
hup:/fwww.ndLorgfaboutipressl2ooo/undp_7172ooo.asp. NOI also said the programme did not have
parliamenlary buy·in. which it did. and that NDl did nOI do such programmes. whieh it did.
6'National Dcmocr:llic Institute for lmemational AffaiB. Rupport suit.. alU fubles rondt'S <i fa
Chumbr.. d..s R..prisell/ull/s du ,\faroc. Rahal. MQF~: lS-16 ocrOOre 1000 (Rabat. Morocco: Nalional
DemCKratic Institulc For Inlernalional Affairs, 2000. -lnilialemcm. Ie NOl propose l'elaboT:llion d'un
pr()grammc en lrois parties visanl a renfOfCet" la fonction de redaction des lois de la Chambre des
ReprisenlanlS....-.p.2.
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topic of media relations. The goal of that programme. designed and funded prior to
parliamentary consultation or buy-in. was to improve the capacity of parliament (and
committees in panicular) to communicate its work to the \vider public. rcountered that
parliaments are often weak and ill.respected because they do not fulfill their proper
functions. not because they have not issued press releases lauding the liule they do. The
substitution of the Namibian programme was in part an easy solution as the new field
representative had recently worked in that legislature. It is also an example of failing to
tailor legislative development to the particular institution. and failing to ensure the
programme has intemal suppan.
Legislatures ultimately lose legitimacy through incapacity and inaction (or
corruption). They risk appearing stubbom if they simply block executive initiatives
without good reason or without offering their ovm proposals. and are perceived as
simply obstructionist. provoking executive reaction in direr circurnstances.1>l When the
Moroccan parliament conducted a ground-breaking inquiry into corruption in the
banking and loans sector. it ",as lauded in the press throughout the country simply
because it had done what a parliament is supposed to do. This was not lost on the
members. who then realized they needed more resources for research 10 conduct such
inquiries.6s
In his ankle "Legislative Structure and Constitutional Viability" Baaklini makes
UBaakJini.··Lcgislawl'\':StructureandConstitulionaIViabilily:·p.IJI.
&lConvc~lionwith members of House ofRcprescnlalives. Rabal. Morocco. o.:ccmber :!OOO.
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another key point. often nOI appreciated by legislalive aid practitioners coming out of thc
US system: "Legislatures perfonn diffcrent functions undcr different political systems:~
Ncedler \\-Tites that a legislature must be underslood in ils cont~XI. through consideration
of the power structures and larger political systcm.67 Understanding Ihe place of the
Moroccan parliament in that country's Inlnsition and politicallifc would have arguably
changcd the focus of ils programme.
Carolhers notl'S that one of the great weaknesses of democracy aid is the "aid
providers' lack of knowledge about the politicaL.dynamics oflhe institutions they are
trying 10 reshape..:' and their .....detennination to apply models that lit poorly with the
local situation..... This happens because Ihc praclilioners do //0/ kno\\" the local
situalion.6 ' The simple repetition of the Namibian parliamentary media programme in
Morocco - without parliamentary consullation or a proper asscssmcnt - is an example.
Carothers's is one oflhe most reccnt and well-known examinations of the current
industry of democracy assistance. Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Clln·e.
6/lBaakJini. '"Legislature Suucture and Constitutional Viability:' p.133. NOI appreciates this better
than <Mhers. but there remains a strong emphasis on 'oven;ighC, a uniquely congressiooaltenn. NOl's
GIliJ"booi!or Implemefllillg Legis/Of0'" Programm..s makes the point that while there is much that is
different between transilitlrnll democracies. -[underlying the work is thcl ...assumption th.:u undefJlins much
oftoda}"s democratic development assistance ...Itllatlthe path to democratic de~elopment is a shared one in
\~ihich different countries ha~emuch in CQmmon. This assumptioo has been reinforced by the exchanges of
democratic development Hperience...." (Guidebook Preface). Sec also Carothers. -The End oftile
Transition Paradigm.- Journal ofDemocracy 13.1 (January 2002): 5-21.
67Needler,p,15S.
"'Carothers. Aiding D~mocr<lC)' Abroad p.IS3.
published in 1999. seeks to examine basic questions in me field of democracy aid....
With respect to legislative development. he notes there are four common areas of
assistance: training and technical assistance to members. direct training and technical
assistance 10 staff. infrastructure support and finally and distinct from me above three.
bouom·up approaches: helping outside actors such as NGOs. journalists and policy
institutes in their approaches to legislatures.711 All lour approaches (see Figure 4.1) are
captured in two broad goals. The first is to increase the effecliveness of me legislature.
while the second is to make it more representative. According to Carothers. the first
means helping legislators pass better laws. and improving on internal procedures in
general." The second goal- more representative - means helping legislators take into
account the views of those who elected them. and generally involves constituency
offices. hearings. transparency and public access to the institution and legislative
proccss.~
6IIlbid.pp.vii_viii.
70 lbid pp.I80-181.
71 Ibid.p.180.
r.lbid.p.180.
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Legislative Assistance Standard Menu
Building IhcCapacilies of legislators
Traininglcgislalors
On'iUbslance: nature ofdemocracy; specific political and c(;OIlomic lopics;
comparativclcgislativcsyslcms
On methods: legislative process: usc ofparliamenlary commin~: value
ofpublicheatings:ConslituenC)'outre3ch:tr.Lrlspan:ncy:
accountability
Buitding lllc capacity oftcgislalh'c staff
Traininglcgislati\'cstafT
OnsubSlantt:
On methods:
budget anal~'sis: polky analysis
Jcgislativc resean:h: bill drafting: mooia relations: cOIIStirucnt
relations
Str¢11glhcninginfrastructure
Slocklibr.uies
Underwriting new buildings
?rovidingofTiceequipmenl
Developing new infonnation systems
BolSlcring input and senllin)' from NGOs and m.:dia
Suppa"ing NGOs lh:u promote parliamentary transparency and accountability
TrainingjoumaliSI$ 10 cover Iegislalun:s
Aiding advocacy NGOs lhal provide l~hnical input 011 bills
Flgure4.1~glslallveAsSISlanceSlandardMcnu
Source: Carothers. .~iding DemocruC')' Abroad. p.179.
Ultimately though. as Kornberg and Musolf write. and as mentioned above. e"en where
legislalUres exist as facades - let alone where they function well· broad goals can be
cirt;umvented: they can develop into something quite unexpected later. They may.
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according to Sisson. develop different or new functions than those originally possessed.7}
It will ullimately require more than the speculation of scholars and current aid
practitioners to understand it:
IfslIChspecuJationsaregroundalinempiricalreality.lhenthecollIinuc:dSludyof
legislaliveinstirulions.lhcirprocessesandoutpul$.theirroksandfuoclionsvis:iv;s
othcr inSlilutions in the political Syslcm. and thcir resportsiveness 10. aoo suppon from.
general and specific publics remain imponanl wks ror Iqisillive schol:lll'5 Ind
"pnClilioncl'5" Ilikt. !empllasisminc].7.
This is precisely what, with few exceptions. is not }'et happening. There is little
comparative infonnation sharing with the work. being done at present. Scoll writes about
the competition and tension within the 3id practitioner network, sometimes spilling over
into conflict. 7l Clashes occur over competing and contradictory efforts. different
versions or elements of democracy being promoted. and specific goals. t3ctics. and other
'strings' and issues.76 But Scott - erroneously I believe - suggests lhat such a network.
exists." From my experience. that is nOI the case.
In "US Democracy Promotion: Critical Questions:' Steve Smith focuses on the
theory underlying dernocrocy promOlion efforts abroad. writing that the field is mostly
7lJohn R. Sisson. "legislatures in Developing Political Systems:' iI5 ciled in Kornberg and Musolf.
"Legislarures in Developmental Perspective:'p_29.
NKomberg and Musolf. "legislatures in Developmental Pcrspectives:' p29.
7~Scoa. ··Trasnalionali.l:ing..... p. 165.
76Ibid.p.165.ln my Ihrec and a halfyears. I nOled cla5hcs with IFESand USAID. the latter quite
detTimemal 10 our work in Morocco.
nlbid.p.I66.L!n!etonosuch.·cross-fertilizalion'ocCUTSoriscnCOIJTaged
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immune to criticism.ls While perhaps not a sacred cow. democracy is difficult to auack
in theory.N In the final third of this chapter. however. I will look at the practice of
democracy aid. I will consider some general criticisms. before focusing on three specific
ones: the lack of systematic study. a simplistic core strategy. and inadequate assessment.
There are numerous miscellaneous criticisms which could each merit an
independent study. They include the tendency ofdemocracy promotion to givc money to
American organiza!ions to do the work rather than to fund indigenous or national
organizations (a disparity felt keenly by those with whom we work).lO Criticisms can be
made regarding democracy aid's rhelorical excesses which create high expectations. the
serious overestimation ofcaJXIcily or ability on the pan of donors (and lhe US in general)
to affect political life and events abroad: and the inadequacies ofs~cific lools and
tactics employed.11 The latter include thc lendency of democracy promolers 10 invest
attention and focus on one or a few leaders in the hope that they will be able to carry off
"SI~V~ Smith. MUS Dem(l(:racy Promolion: Critical QuestioAs," Amaic<Jn DemocraC)' Pramotian.
p.64. Hi§ crilique e.~presses reservalions aboul ~form Ihat democracy promcKion takes abroad. While not
strictlyrtlaledtomyth~sistopic.ilisperltapssuffici~nllodraw:lltenlionlothebroadrangeandnJlureof
hi§ crilicisms: first. his historical regard ofth~ US government's policy is not pooiliv~: sei:ond. he suggests
lhedefinilionofdemocracyuscdisinadequ3Ie[thi§andlhenextcriliquedoin fact relate. and will be
examined later): third. the actual promotion is ofa limited democracy: founh. lhe fact thaI globalizalion
complicales the simplistic nOlion of democracy uscd; and fifth. IhecomplicJtedn:lationshipbelWeen
demlXracyandneoliberalec:onomicsigncredbyaidpraclitioners.pp.6S.67.72.7~.77.
NSmilh. "US Democracy PromcKion:' p.65. 67. 72. 74. 77.
"'Carothers. "Democracy PromOlion UnderClinlon: p.23.
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democracy. Carothers calls this 'great l~ader syndrome. 'I! There is also the bias towards
high-visibility activities that will sell wcll back in the US. especially to democracy
promotion funders. Field staff are encouraged to record activities with photos and arc
encouraged to send press clippings and anicles back to Washington as 'signs' of
progrommesuccess.
But while particular criticisms e:<ist. three larger concerns stand out in the
literature. confirmed in my esperience: a lack of systematic study. inappropriate core
strategy. and weak programme assessment. Paradosically each of these areas as they
now stand serve to enhance the work currently being conducted. The lack of systematic
study gives the work an energy and dynamism not dependent on long reflective analysis
beyond the scope of practitioners such as NO!. A simple -Ameri-centric' core str.ttegy
simplifies the Institute's approach. focused on what it knows best_ and facilitates quick
programme execution.
'
:; Finally. a lack of pre- or post-programme assessment goes hand-
in-hand with the for"'..ard operational focus and fluid. fast moving programme execution.
Nonetheless. their faults remain.
'1Ibid.p.23.Soren5tnraiseswquestionoftlleroleofleade~-theriseofMandehlSversus
Mobutus, as il were - which mutes ClU'Owrs' criticisms. Good Icaders can accomplish somcthing olhers can
not, often through great moral persuasion and competency. Georg SorenMln. ~The Impasse of Third World
Democratization: Africa Revisited:' Amuiclln Demucrocy Promorion. pp.187-307. See also, Daniell.
Hyman and Kenneth M. Pollack. "Let Us Now Praise Great Men: Bringing the Statesman Back In:'
/nl<,rnolionoISecuriry2S.4(Springl001).I07·146.
I'There are alMl countries that are ambitious to implement a US congressional model. such as
Nigeria and oflate Indonesia. They are not interested in parliamentary systems where legislatures have liltle
real cootrol over what the executive does.
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Systemal;c SludJl
The lack of systematic study refers to the failure of aid practitioners to properly
study or consider where and what they are doing. and the failure to engage in strategic
thinking. As Burnell writes. 'lhe shonage of strategic thinking about how to best support
democratization.... is a common complaint (and an appalling gap) among democratic
practitioners....
Practitioners of legislative aid have not engaged in systematic study. undergirded
by reflection on functions of legislatures in transition. how and why they mailer. or on
how we can best aid them to do what the~' are supposed to do. Neither the body of
literature on legislatures in transition nor legisl:ltive development have been considered.
or discussed. nor even shared among practitioners in the field. Carothers ""TItes that:
theaClual direcl influence ofthescll\llar:y work on democraliz.uion... llas been
low.....Vel'),fewoflheprojetlpapers...COnUlinanyreferencetoacademie ....Titingon
democralizalion. There has been linleborrowingofconcep15 from lhe literalure. nor lias
lherebeen lhat much direcl inlercllange of ideas be)'ond tile occasional letturebya
visiting academic or the input ofa small number ofpolilkal scienlisu "ho have served
as democracy officers with USAID.1l
The consequences of this shoncoming are very real. Burnell notes that where the work
has failed - often because understandings arc "shallow". there has been a hesitancy to
acknowledge it and leam the appropriate lessons.S6 There are also challenges in where
"'Peler Burnell. ~Democracy Assistance: Stale of the ArC De"fOCf'ocy Allist"nce." International
CooperQ/ionfor Democroti=otion Ed. Peter Bumell. (Ponland: Frank Casso 20(0). p. 346.
15Carollten.. Aiding Democra~'Abroad p.93.
S6 Bumel1,"Slalcorthe An:" p.346
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and how aid practitioners promote democracy, but that also has gone unstudied.
Questions about thc suitability of democracy to panicular countries and cultures are left
unexplored as welL'7 From my experience. practitioners simply often do not know."
While parliamenlS are the participant institutions ofchoiee in modem
democracies. that function is served in part by other means in countries in transition, For
example. tribes often perfonn an advocacy and representative function.~ Parallel
structures of tribes and sheiks who arc represented in parliament may be important but
not are understood. NDI appreciated this to some degree and wanted 10 study it.
Carothers even lauded the Institute's goal.oo But the study was ncverdone. Ultimately.
the nature of the Institute is not to engage in such reflective undertakings, In any e\·ent.
the donors do not often fund it.
Additionally. one analysis forecast the declining role of the parliament and the
expanding role of the appointed consultative council.~' NDI did not work with the
consultative council despite invitations from ilS chainnan to do so. We had a
I1 lbid.p.355.
UMy experience in Madagascar was that 'we' simply did nOl know and understand Ihe culture we
worked in. Shortly after my posting in Yemen. l met with an Arab American who gave me a crash course on
Arab culture and politics over coffee in Amman, Jonlan.lt was the only ·training'l received in lhis respect.
rlSchwedler. -on Democracy," p.:!. Emphasis added.
"OCarothers• .~iding CkmocraC)' Abrood. p.IOS. The idea to study the tribes and their interplay imo
parliament and civil society is credited to David Nassar.
qlSchwedler, -On Democracy:'p.3
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pret:onceived nOlion based on a US-inspired core slr.llegy Ihalsees appointed upper
chambers as undemocratic. BUI as one Yemen scholar \~lites. ··Understanding the
polilical evolulion underway in Yemen requires that one abandon fixed notions of
precisely how change ··should·· take place:"': That analysis ended with a critique of the
lack of systematic study or analysis of the environments in which legislative and political
de\·c!opmem sometimes occurs;
...fNlhepolilicalanalySllhepolilical;mdsociaIJ;mdscapeofYe~ncanOOlbejudged
according 10 proyess achieved along a continuum from a lr.ldi!iona: socicly' 10 a modem
one....This Msuccess Nfailurc·· school ofanalysiscanool begin loapprttiatethechangcs
taking place "·ithin Yemeni sociCly-. and go,·cmmcnl accounlabilily· can be underslood
only wilhin lhe COnleX! oflhe mulliple and dynamic power WlJctures wilhin Ycmen. The
issueath;mdisnOilhefoundingofparlicipaminslitulions.bullheac!Ualc.\crciseof
power. OnJylhen c;m onc begin to appreeiale lheimpacloflhe introduetionofnew
panicipalOl)' political ;OSlilulions on Yemen's polilical;md sociaIIOll1dscape.~;
Even when democracy aid does look at legislatures. the allemion accorded it is
limited. Carothers's critique gives electoral. political pany. and civil society
developmem respecti\'dy 16 'I:. 15 and ~O pages of consideration. Legislatures are
considered injusl8 ~':.'"
A cursory understanding of the transition underway in Morocco would have lold
NOI thai the parliamem was not an institution of power or inlluence. and was nOllikely
10 serve the cause ofdemocratic refonn. [t was a tool of co-option in the whole facade.
~:Ibid. p.].
~Jlbid. pA
"'Carolhen.AiJing D..moall<}·.~broad. pg. IV. 123.2018. This may also rtn«1 bias of donors
from working wilh legislatures. for a mullirude ofrtasons: Jack ofinleresl. lack of results. Adminedly
qUOII1litali'·edocsoolcnsurcqualilalive.bulinconlextilisasign.
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Unfonunately. aid practitioners '-herald a new parliament while kno\\ing little of the
actual relations between the parliament and the citizenl1·....,~
Carothers acknowledges that the problem cuts both wa.ys: the failure of
organizations doing the work to undertake systematic study of what they are themselves
doing. for a number of reasons. and the failure of academics on the oUlSide to undertake
systematic study of democracy assistance. The political science literature on
democratization is abundant. The same can not be said for the literature on democracy
assistance.""
The lack of slUdy of democrac~'aid. either by practitioners or academics.
weakens the work in four principal ways:
[IJ .. .insulTicientcrosslearningaboutpromotingdemocraC)·amongdiITerentregionsur
amongdifferentS«t~inn:<:ipientcounuies:·{21...~dispiritingtendencyto...-ard
constanlrein\'entingofthe...-heel in aid organizations as personnel shiftinto and out of
positions.pani<:ularly·ingroups...-ortinginthelieldforthelil"5ttime.[3IPtopleseemlo
believe thaI merely being a citizen ofademocralic couott)'qualifies them splendidlyto
promote democracy anywhere cl~. [~I Utilizing IheirO\Olllimit~ instinctS and ideas
about 1I0w OemocnlC)" is supposed to \lork. they generote programmes witlliinle lIelp
from any body ofleamingother than occasion.al reports containing lists of anodyne
QS Carotllers. "Democraq' PromOlion Under Clinton:' p.:!}. When I ...-'enttO Yemen. I was lold we
....·ould be sllifting focus to the newly elected parliament. despite nOl having actual fumh to do the
progr.unmc (my pre\'ious upcrience with NOI ...."<IS in legislative developmenl but in Yemen .... e II.ad only
part). development fund5). Neither funding for. nor an undetsUU1ding of.~ Yemeni parliament went into
this'assessment:
'1l>Carothers. Aiding Democracy .~broaJ. p. 9. Reasons indudes the fact tllal academics are
unawareofthe~...-thofdemocnlC}'as.sistance.thetendellCyloperceivesuchforeignaidas··self·inlereSted
inlel"lentions in inlemal politics.' or the view that it is a domain unrelated 10 tr.ldiliooal moti\<Itions of
acaikmicinquiry.
971n 1998NOlconductedthrce·beSlproctices·me.:lingsforfieldrepresentatives .....orking .....ith
polilical pa.rties,legislalures. and ci\'il society'respectively. These .....erethefil"5lmcetingsoftheirkind.and
lI"ereinvaluablc.
lessons kamed ranging (rom ~8e sensilive 10 lile local en,-irOl'1menC 10 ~Democrac~- is
nOI3chievedovemigln.-ql
Even where academic or prof~ssionalassessments exist. NOI was apt to ignore
lhem. A Democracy Assessment o[.\/orvcco prepared by a US academic and consultant
for U5AID in Morocco in 1998 statcd "This report does not suggest that parliamentary
development be a primary focus ofUSAID's DIG (Democracy/Gm'ernance) acti\·ities:·
NDi ignored this recommendation and disputed with both the mission and USAlD in
asserting its prerogativcs to work with tile parliament and political panics in the country.
based simply on its biases of what should be done. but no strong assessment of what
could be done.
The "scarcity of systematic study" ultimatcly means the political dcvelopment
industry is unable to provide basic answcrs to two basic questions: whether it works. and
if 'we' know what we arc doing.... Even a series of NOI meetings. grouping legislative
and political party field representativcs to assess our work. avoided these qucstions. 50
do thc quarterly and final reports on programmes. which look more at what was done.
Nors largest internal assessment to date has examined relations between the Instiwte
9lCarothers.. Aiding Democr<J<)· Abroad, p.IO.
""Ibid. p.IO. Given lilat the besl trainers I had used in programmes abroad were lhree academics
who had experien<:e in politics as parliamenlarians, I suggesled 10 NO! thaI we use similar lr.Iiners in lhe
fUlure.! "''MlMay27,2002oldsuchacademicswouldcloudlheirconlnbulions"-ilillheoryand \\'ouldbe
unpraclicallnliners.
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and its biggest funder. USAID. It lookcd principally at questions ofintemal management
and culture. 100
Training and teaching programmes should be based on a better research. but thus
far the gap remains. 1Q1 Ultimately. little of what is done relates to a theoretically
grounded or empirically accurate kno..... ledge of what lcgislatures actually do or are in
transitional situations. or how they affect trnnsitions. Carothers acknowledges this point
early in his book. and gh'es reasons that can be summed up in the phrase 'dissimilar
enterprises' of the acad~mies and practitioners. This ~ncompasses se\'eral points:
the explanatory or backward-looking nature of academic studies vcrsus the
forward operational focus ofaid practitioners:
an academic focus on internal reasons for democratization versus thc
practitioners practice of extemal assistance and influence:
competing theories ofacademics otTer little or no basis of choice to practitioners:
the low threshold of patiencc or interest among practitioners for academic jargon:
the lack of time to consider academi..: literature. also a product of the forward
operational focus: and finally.
l00Convenations with NDI stalT. Washington. D.C.. March 200 I.
IOIKomberg and Musolf. -on legislalures in Developmenlal Persp«live.H p.29. The authors also
menlion a proposal to create Comparative legislafive Smdy Cenlers around lhe US. with the goal being
Hlltc leslingofh)polltescs and the genermion of new knowledge wilh rcsp«t 10 IegislalUJ"esandlcgislalivc
dcvdopmenl. ..•H
-'ideological rifls between the academy and the [U.S.) govemment."IO:
Carothers \\ntes that the field is inadequately sludied. and the sharing of infonnation
limited. resulling in a .....eak body of knowledge in general. lOJ He hopes it \\111 change:
"There remains a great need to connect serious academic Ihinking. on democratization
with the praclice of democracy promotion. Many components of the subject remain
.....oefully under-examined ... ·I:}.! Practitioners need the academy. and the academy can
reinfon:e the field.
Core Strategy
Core strategy is another fundamental area of weakness in legislative democracy
assistance. According to Carothers. ifone were told there was democracy aid in a
country. without being told the counlf)' name. one could guess Ihe general assistance
without knowing the counlf)·. A basic package ofassistance exists, independent of the
country being assisted. stemming from the adoption ofa core strategy.IO~
This core strategy incorporales a model of both democracy and democratization
which ser\'es to guide the donors. The model of democracy· defined as a democracy
IO:Carothcrs. ,~iding D~mocrtlC)' Abroad. p.94.
IO'lbid.pp.332_333.
lo.I lb1d.p.H9.EvenascarlyasI966.llwassuggciledthatpraclltIOllCriandschol=ihould
'talk: Packenham. "Leglslatures and Political Development:' L<'gislatures in ~'efopmenlalPerspeclr.·e.
pp.S21-S82.
IO~Carolhers, .~iding D~mocrru:)' Abrood. p.8S. ElectiOns. parliaments. judicial refonn. are all
elements of the basic package.
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remp/ale by Carothers - includes three categories: elections. institutions and civil society.
Notv.;thstanding the complexity and uniqueness ofeach Ir.lnsition in the world. this
template is used to identify the key institutions and processes that are 10 be expected in
any given democracy. 1011
This simplified template of institutions and processes model is then used in
conjW1ction with a model of democratization. or assumptions of the sequence of political
steps that bring about greater democracy. An initial political opening is followed by
elections. followed by eITorts to democratize political panies and other institutions.
Eventuall)·. eITons tum to the extension of democratic nonns and practices among civil
society.lu7 Aid pro\'iders funher simpli~' this process to supply and demand in a
transition. as NOI did in MorocCO. IOI
A third element pan of the core strategy is the concept of institutional modeling.
thaI is. the attempt to modd institutions in new democracies after western ones. Ill'l It is
here that what Carothers terms ··America·specific conceptions" may most influence
democracy aid programmes. in attempts to make legislatures ring \\lth the strengths
unique to the US Congress. such as legislative drafting. strong oversight and direct
U.... lbid.p.86
I071bid. p,87. Sec also Carothers. 'End of the Transition Par.tdigm.~
IotAs nafro before. NOI preferred 10 \\ork with paniesand th.: parliament to slrengthen the supply
side of the political equal ion. \lhereas USAIO and the US Demoeraq' Working Group in Morocco
preferm:llo \lark on lhe demand side. \lith civil society in Morocco. Coove~lions. USAIO. Rabat.
Morocco. Oclober2000.
10'lCarGthers. .~iding D~mo<;rfJ<'Y Abroad. p.90.
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representation (as opposed to strong party caucuses as present in parliamentary
syslems).IIO This is .....hy democracy assistance consists of so much training of actors in
such institutions as legis[atllrCS simply to adopt and act as such actors would in a
comp3Iable .....estern institution. the US Congress.111
There are obvious benefits to the concept ofa core strategy. It essentially
simplifies choices and programme contents for donors. providing a template of sons
.....hen one attempts to decide what to do in a given country. II; But a core strategy
approach also contains flaws. [t reduces democratization to a one-size-lits-all tcmplate
that is not in fact appropriate to different democratic transitions. II> What occurred in
Namibia has not occurred in Morocco. yet the Institute proposed a programme of
legislative development in the laller that was simply copied from the former. Other
criticisms include me focus on fonnal institutions to the detriment of underlying
processes. a tendency to ignore values and culture. and the unreflecti\-e application of
institutional fonn checklists. III The favouring ofa check·list approach to democracy
IlOlbid.p.85.
1l1 Ibid.p.90.
1I:lbid.p.8S.
II}Crnwford refers 10 the concept ofinstitutionaJ modeling as the ancmp! by aid programmes 10
~uce the deficit ofinstilUlions from ideal ...-estern forms.~ Gordon Crawford. For~ign Aid <1nd Polilical
R"form: A Comparati.." Anal.rsu 0/(J.,mocracy .~$si$lunt:t und PoNlical Co"dil;ona/i~' (New York;
Palgrave.:!OOI).p.15
Il·Crawford. Foreign Aid <1nd Polilicol Reform. pp.16-f12.
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assistance includes inslitutional targets that miss or ignore "modulations in the process
ofchange.·· II !
One example of the unsuitability of the American model is Russia.. where Peter
Rulland \\TItes .....the checklist approach is rather nai"e in adopting a procedural
conception of democracy. reducing it to a set of values and institutions. \Vbat is absent is
any consideration of politics.. :·116 Scott also makes this criticism. saying democracy
practitioners work within the confines of a 'western conception ofdemocracy. '111 That
same checklist is applied in countries like Yemen and Morocco. among others.
The solution or response to check-list assistance is closely related to the other
two criticisms I make here. Indeed. democracy assiSlancc should be adapted to local
circumslances. and not apply a strict model ofwhal democracy (or democratization)
should be. While there may De much in common betm::en any two transitions. there is
also much that is unique. More careful study of local circumstances. including
distinguishing between different situations or experiences in transition. Some countries
are progressing slowly. others are stalled. and still more arc reversing. Democracy
assistance should "m)" between such candidates for aid. III
II!Bumell. M[)c,mocracy Assi;lance: Suno: of the DiscOllI>C:' p.15. He n:therlces both Carothers's
mick M[)emocralization : The Question OfSualegyM:IS "'elias his book Aiding D~moc,.a<J·AbrO<Jd.
1I6Rutlaod. -Russia: Limping Along To....ards Amerie3l\ Democracy:' p..H6.
lI7Scon. ··Transnationali:ing DemoeraC)':' p.J6-l.
IllBurnelL ·Democraey Assiscance: Stale of the Discourse.Mpp.~4·25.
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Adapting the model of democracy and democratization to a larger understanding
of what is actually happening in a given country requires a final step before determining
the actual assistance to be given. that of proper assessment. Regrenably. reforms taking
place within USAID. the principal US donor ofdemocracy aid. deal mostly with
questions of priorities and imemal structures. and less with basic assumptions of the
methods ofaid conducted."~ Goals of supporting local institutions to de~'elop along
western institutional designs or -blueprints' \\ill simply not work.'~o
ASU$Smenl
A third principal area of weakness in democrac~' assistance is the inadequate or
nawed assessment of democracy aid programmes. In my experience_ assessment has at
least three stages. The first is the pre-assistance or needs assessment that attempts to
study conditions orand opportunities for demoo.;rac~· aid in a gin:n country. The second
is on-going assessment during programme execution. which ideally allows the
programme to adapt to changing circumstances on the ground. The third stage is post-
programme asscssmem. to determine if a programme has met its objectives or produced
results. intended or othef\\ise. This third level would also help determine future
assistance and ensure programme continuity.
Assessment is differem from the systematic study referred to earlier. Systematic
ll~Carothers. -Aiding Po~t-eommunlSl Societies: A Beller Way?" Problems o/Pos/-Communism
(September/October 1996l.p.16.
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study examines larger questions concerning the role of IcgislaTures in a given lransition
or legislative functions in general. More work in Ihis area would help bridge the gap
exisling between aid praclilioners and academics. Systematic study would also give
practitioners a more comprehensive understanding ofa given country. including the
'larger picture' allowing a donor to determine laler in a closer assessment where and if a
democracy programme might best be targcted.
Assessment entails a more careful study of the praclicalities related 10 democracy
assistancc. It is more focused on the needs and opportunities for assistance as well as
questions related 10 a particular project underway or once completed. Assessment must
also include an honesl appraisal of what a given donor can expect to achieve in any
democracy assistance programme. As Burnell writes. "While the assessmenl of
requirements and opportunities in a country should be informed by a sound knowledge
...thc potcntial for change and the challengcs. so thcre must be a rcalistic appraisal by the
democracy assistance provider or its 0\\11 strenglhs and limitations as well:'I~'
Unfortunately. the two major legislative aid programmes I conducted featured no
assessment. and this may be reflected in the subsequent programmes. Given the general
lack or assessment. it is diffic..it to know. Informed assessments of requiremenIS and
opportunilies were nOI madc. NDI did nOI possess a soWld knowledge of Yemen. and
even less so of Morocco. No proper assessment of eilher parliament undergirded our
allcmpts 10 work wilh them. Indeed. in Ihe case of Morocco. the Institute did nOI possess
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such an elemt:mar~: 'tool" for understanding the parliament"s powers as the inlernal by-
laws or rules of procedure. I:: Thus far. NOrs model of assessment ofa national
legislature is a checklist of questions heavily influenced by the American modeL 1::'> ils
assessment of needs and opponunities is mostly tied to the subjecLS for which funding
might exist, I:' As Melia notes. it would be hoped that more atlention "ill be gi"en to
this.':~ An appr03ch that might be considt:red is one developed by the United Nations. in
which a set of pre-condilions is used to help the organization determine whether and
what form of3id to prov;de. ':6 This could also serve in the s~-stcm3tic study phase.
Assessment during the actu31 programme st3ge is complic3ted by the lack of
flexibility on the part of funders 10 change programmes already undelviay. When we
discovered the p3l'liamem in Morocco was not imerested in working with us. NO! had
practically no leeway 10 rc-programme lhe funds to oller assistance to c;vil society. even
under the general rubric of a legislalive theme. The response to any allempt to change
l::My work in Madagascar ....as preteded by an assessment mission. bUI it only e.lamined the
possibilily of work with the parliament. I was also part ofan assessmentleam 10 Togo. which also focURd
OIl the parliamenl. In that both aid programmes entailed an anempt to build a projecl on the basis ofan
assessment. they were positive. Yel no genel1ll country assessment. of wider needs and oppommilies.....as
Conducled.llmay\erywellha\·e~nthataidingthelegislaturesinbothinSlanceswas not appropriate.
l:lNalional Democralic Institute for Inlemalional Affairs, OUI/ine[w 8Wi..lin...~sunnt..nt ora
L"gisJatll'''[Of' .vDf Programming {Washingron. D.C.: Nalional Democr.:nic InSlitute for Inlemalional
Affairs. July 1996).
1:'NDl had already opted 10 conduct work with the panics and pat"liamenl in Morocco, for
e~ample. independent of :m~' assessment. This .....as also the cas< for Togo and Madagascar. m.16S.
l:sMelia.Revj.ew.p.s.
l:&united Nalions. Pr~ndilionsforProdding .~ssi.{/l1nC't! (New York: Depanmenl ofPolilical
Affairs. Elecloral Assistance D[\·ision. Oclober 2000). URL:
hnp:J/w....w.un.Of"g!DeplSldpallead'websiIN.hlm.
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the programme was ·thafs not what we said we would do in our proposal.· That the
proposal was itself not developed on the basis ofany assessment of what we should be
doing in Morocco was made all the more stark.':~
Post-projcctas5essment is also weak or non-existent. in my experience. Often
there are no budget allocations for post-programme assessments. and no time is allotted
to evaluation. \\-nere it is done. it generally includes reponing on procedures ofconduct.
or olTering anecdotal comments from programme participants (those attending seminars
for example). There is a tendency to report on what aid donors have done in a particular
quaner. or with whom the aid practitioner conducted a meeting (often referred to as
consultations in reportS). Statistics such as the nwnber of training sessions or
panicipants arc also highlighted. 1:1
A failure to assess more qualitative 3.~pccts. including alack ofa will to reform
or cooperate on project objccti\·es. is ignored. I:· ~..ly assessment on the ground in
Morocco was that the parliament was not interested in working with NO!. This ....as not
acknowledged in Nors reportS on the programme. despite the same assessment b~
1:10iITertm funders ha.·c differing<k~ ofl1cxibility. Thc Nalional Endo....mcnt of D.emocr.lcy
is more leniem hcreas othCI"$ donors .... ill allow onl~' l~. ofan}' line-item in a blldgct to be
reprogrammed '..ithin the contincs of the projttl objccli\'cs.
1!IGolllb.p.58.
I~Carothcr.; mcntions this fundamenlall1aw sc"er.lllimes in Aiding Dcmocr<l<.)· .~bN)f.ld.
csp«:ial1ypp.304-J08.
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USAID and the US Embassy in Morocco before NDI had beKiIn its work. I;.)
When asked 10 recommend a future programme in Morocco - adopting the glass
is half full analogy and assuming the work might be of value· I recommended. based on
my experience O\'er the eourse ofeight months in the country. that NOI support the
creation ofa parliamentary centre focusing on research capacities and institutionalizing
legislative assistance. This was supported by the only other parliamentary donor in the
country (the UNDP who expressed interest in funding it) and by the parliamentary
leadership we both worked with. As mentioned above. the Institute inslead substituted a
programme thaI had been used in Namibia by my successor. It was nOI based on any
assessment. and was not discussed with parliamentary conmcts until after it was
approved and funded.
Numerous factors limit the abililY and inlerest of donors in conducting POSI-
programme assessment. including the nature of projects proposed and the fOl'\\<U'd
operational focus of aid practitioners (both compounded by the nalure ofcontract work
of the field representatives). Projects contain little or no assessment methodologies. apan
from written reports - usually written by staff in Washington - discussing political events
in a given country and programme activities. as well as fulure activities. Ultimately staff
spend a year executing a programme. requiring the fuJI year 10 complete the programme
IWCarolhers notes the lendency of USAID to characterize !he politically connected inSliNICS such
as NO! as '!ioiIcred cows.' be)"GIld n:ach bccalJS<: of their Wa5hington conneclions..-riding Democr<JC)'
.-throat! pp.25g.259. This ",as pm:isel)' the case in Morocco......here NOI's preference 10 work willt
parliamenl and polilical panics was strongly opposed b)' the Embassy. USAlD and !he long-term US
Consul. logellter comprising the Dcmocr.K:~· Working Group (OWG).
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objecti ....es (measured by the number of seminars proposed in the programme. for
example). On completion of the contract. no time remains to conduct an assessment.
odier than in an anecdotal form.
The forward operational focus of the work means on completion of a programme.
staff are already contemplating next steps. in the effort 10 obtain either new or on·going
funding and to meel 'pressing' needs - as they see il - in working to ad\'ance democracy.
ThaI ....ery phrase - working to advance - docs not allow much reflection on past efTons.
What is past is past. and a new day means new work. not rehashing past effons. 1l1
Another difficulty in good assessment is the micro-macro gap. or the challenge in
determining the effeCtS of individual democracy progrnmmes on larger political
S)·Slems. IJ1 If democracy aid is to mature. though. and achie....e its high goals. it has to
assess where il has come from as well as where it might go. Burnell writes:
Inevitably there will be growing demands for lhe dTe<:ti\-eness ofprogramm~ and
proje<:1S10 be identified. evaJuated and compared. Jncreasingly such quC"Stionsas is il
worting? how \OIell is it wurting? and huw do we know?are bound to be asked. In
short. "hal has been achieved 10 dal.: and at whal COSI? How does the re<:ord compare
wilh othcrand more broadly·based approachcs to promotingdemocracyaruund the
"-urld.suchas investment in education and «onomicgroy,lh. or the dira:t allevialionof
poverty. which may huld keys to the success or failure of~mocracyassistarlce?133
For now.lhere are few formal reviews. Instead. practitioners often rely on the expenise
IIIAgain. Burnell "Tites -Impact OlSSCSsments of their wort could be difficult to jU5tify in COSI·
benefitlennsandfairlyredundanl...-StaleoftheAn.··p.350.
Il~lbid. p.'>50.
IJJlbid.p.35J.Ashenotcs.thesequcstionsalsoneedtobeansweredifnothingelse but 10 secure
funding.
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and judgement ofthelicld otTicer.l:i.l Even then. reliance is on infonnation supplied by
the grantees themselves. as Golub notes. and grantees - including NOI - may not have
the time. expenise or even inclination to examine theireffons and impacts. panicularly
whether their work is having unintended effects. III
ConclllSion
The literature on the results of democrac)' assistance is scant. yet the general
consensus appears to be that the work is worthwhile. but limited. and certainly is not
'det~nninanf in anyone country's transition. Where the path is already sct. however.
there may be value in giving assistance. Carothers believes this. and suggests that
practitioners are learning other lessons as well. The learning curve is gentle and
progress is slow. but it is positive. There is much that has not worked. but some has:
...democracy promoters initially brought to their work a surfeit ofexpeclalioll5. hopes
and illusions. T)-pically they started out with OIlJy a shallow understandingof",hat they
wen: doing. havinglinlen:levante.xperience. knowledgeofdemocratization(asopposed
to democracy). and. many times. e.xposure 10 fon:ign political senings at alJ. They
launehed many embarrassingly simplistic Of" misguided efforts and mel few of their
goals. Over the yean, however, they ha,'e acquired experiern.::e md are nowprogressing
along a leaming curve. Democracy programmes are starting to havc fc"-er obvious naws
and to reflect a panem ofconstnlctivcevorution.lJl>
l:i.lGolub. p.58. Sometimes even field officers are bJ.'·passed, as was dOlle in Morocco when NDI's
subsequcnt programmc was not based on either an assessment or my analysis: it was indeed. entin:ly
subjective.
Ill1bid. p.59. Carothers summarizes five general shortcomings. which come dose to my O"Tl
criticisms:-... lackoflocaIO\\Tlershipofaidprojects ....shallowunderstandingofthesocietybeing
assisted.... lack of nexibility....durotion [ofaid projects andl....high cost." .~idi"g D.!mocr"C)' Abroad
pp.:!60-264.
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But the pattern is ··uneven. panial and often excruciatingly slo\, ..:'1)7 And
unfortunately. legislative development is the most difficult objective to achieve.
Carothers says legislative aid is the least successful of all democracy aid" -Its record."
he writes. "is riddled \\ith disappointment and failure." Il ' New lessons are being learned
but they relate to what I call execUlion sensith'ities and sensibilities: immediate
questions of programme manag.ement and administrntion as distinct from larger
questions on legislative functions and rotes in transitions. or how we can best assist
them. Some reviews of the aid are nonetheless optimistic. suggesting such organizations
as NOI have a limited role. uo Part of that role is in shaping an international democratic
culture. I"" This may be democrncy assistance' s best achievement.
Il1lbid.p.331.
UlCarothe~.Aiding lkmocracy Abroad. pp. 181-82.
I;<lJames M. ScOll and Kell>' J. Walter1i. ''Supponingthe Wave: Western Politie:ll Foundations and
the Promotion ofaGlobal Democralic Society." Gfobaf S()(;i"t)·l~. 1 (1000), p.1J7.
I""lbid, p.2J7. See also Scott "Transnationalizing Democrac)" Promotion: The Role of Westem
PoliticaIFoundations.~ScollOver1itatesitwhenhewrites··Perhaps... the most significant consequence is the
tral1snalional norm-building that follows... ;n which political foundations and think-lanks playa pan....the
diffusion of liberal democratic nonns lhat impact notions of the proper fonn ofd!e Stale and rhe propcr
relations between slaleand societl'''' p. 166.
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Chaplcr-5 [\'alua.ion, condusion and pr-oposab
Legislative development work_ is. as this thesis suggests. a new domain. It is also
a difficult domain. one that Carothers calls the most problematic and least successful in
thc field of democracy aid. I But it matters. even ifhow it docs is not fully understood:
...afulldemocratictrnnsitionmustinvolvepolititalsocie~'.andthecompo5ition and
consolidation ofa democratic polity must enlail ~rious IhoUlhl and aelion about
lhow core: instilUlions or a denltXral1c politiellt loOCiely - political parties. elet:lion5.
electoralrules.polilitalleadership,intrapartyaniances.ilnd~i:lilalurn·through
"hichcivil~ie~'cancOf1stilUleilSelfpoliticaIlYlo5e1eclandmonitordemocratiC
government ...-
But with respect to its failings. a USAID framework writlen in 1998 reached a
conclusion similar to Carothers·s. for reasons also noted in this thesis: "Experienee
is...Iimited and there is little convcntional wisdom on when and how to providc
assistance. Because adequate experience has nol yet been amassed.... (Legislative aidl is
one of the more comroversiaJ and challenging of contemporary donor programmes:';
What I have nOl wanted to do in this thesis is otTer a narrowly pessimistic
criticism of the legislative aid programmes I have participated in or \\itnessed. It would
ICarolhers. Aiding Democracy .~brO(ld, p.18l. Says Carother.l, -lfasked to name the area of
democracy assistance thalm05l0l'len falls short of ItS goals. I would have to pointtolegislativeassi5t3l1ce:'
! Alfred Stephan. R~lhinfcingMiN/ory PolitiCS: Brtril and th~ SOlllhern Cone (Princeton: Princeton
University Press. 1988), pA. as cited in Kenerer. "Morocco's New Bicameral Parliament:' p.13. As
Kenerer writes. -Despite years ofscholarly neglecl of the role oft~ lelislature in the developing world. it
isno"",eHunderstoodthataneffec:tlveandreprescntativelegislatureiscrilicallotbelong-termsuccessof
any democratiC process:' Emphasis added.
'Hal Lippman and Jan Emmert. AHisling Legislalures in Dt!\'eloping Counfries: A FrameM'ork!or
Programm~ Planning and ImpJem~nlolion(Washington. D.C.: US Agency for International Devclopmem.
October (997).p.1.
have been possible. as Carothers writes. to offer an entirely lurid and negative
assessment of democracy aid. a portrait of practitioners working with simplistic notions
and schemes. foisting their idealism on places they do not know.'
Falling victim to that characterization has not been my temptation. My
experience has been almost entirely positive. not just because NDI offered me the
privilege of working in exotic countries at exciting times. I have witnesSl.'<!. dramatic
political events up close and offered some solidarity to impressive people at all levels
who are supponing their respective countries' democratic transitions. NDI is possessed
of much enthusiasm. good will and optimism for democracy and for democracy
promotion. not to mention expertise. At alllcYels one finds bright people committed to a
cause. And thcy arc interested in doing better. and are doing so. as Carothers says: the
'democratic assistance leaming curvc' is positivc. l That is true for NDI as well as other
practitioners.
Organizations like NDI have donc much good. The Institute quickly responded to
needs in new emerging democracies. and has targeted legislative bodies when other
donors were reluctant to do so. The Institute advocated the proper place and functioning
of representative. legislative institutions as key to successful democratic development.
even when it was not fully understood. In both Yemen and Morocco. NOI was one of
the first and few to commit to helping these nascent democratic institutions. The danger
·Carolhcrs. Aiding Df!mocror:y Abroad. p.259.
Ilbid.p.H2.
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in not supporting and reforming legislatures may be a loss ofconfidence on the part of
the electorate in representative bodies. executive control. and ultimately democracy
NDI has also developed in the conduct of its legislative programmes. The
Institute has endeavored to grasp the challenges of legislative aid. even ifit is mostly in
terms of management. A conference was held for legislative field representatives to
share their experiences and appropriate lessons learned from the combined wisdom of
the representatives. The fruit of that conference was a GlIidf!bookfor Implementing
Legislo/h'e Programmes.' NDI's ticst Director ofGovemance noted that NDI matured
in its conduct of legislative assistance during the time she held the position. Increasing
numbers of NOI field representatives .....we senior slalTwho served as in-house
parliamentary consultants abroad as opposed to workshop organizers. NO! work was
increasingly focused on the -implementation ofpraclices: such as public hearings. as
opposed to workshops and roundtables"
6Abdularaham Bafadel. ND/ JIIork5hop Reporl. Emerging Democracies Forum (Washington. DC:
National Democratic ln~itl,lte forlntemaliorl;ll Affairs. (999). URl_: http://www.ndi.orgIedti'lrotiscripW
bpt_room2I4.html.
7National Democrntic Institute for International Affairs. GuiJelwolr.fry Impfemenling Legislaliw
ProgrQmme~ (Washingt01l: National Democratic lnslillite for [ntemational Affairs. 2000). As noted earlier
however. the conference and guidebook focusedonoperationalqueslions$Uchasprogrammce.~ecution.as
opposed to an increased understanding in legislalivefunctions intransilions. or legislative models in
different e~periences. This is suggested in the title by the word impff!meming.
'Conversalion with NO! Dirc<:IOf ofGo~emance. June 2000. Governance is incidentally the term
used by NDl and including both legislative developmenllllld local administration programmes. My
successor in Morocco is a good uample of someone serving as an in-house consultant......orting closely
with parliarm:nlary members including presiding officers to offer immediate and dctailed assistance. NO!
even maiolaincd an office in the Namibian parliament, when: ~he "'<IS b.lsed prior to worting in Morocco.
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The Institute is also systemizing its information on legislative de\'elopmenl. and
has worked al making much of it available through Ihe intemet to its representatives and
others." Relationships with the UNDP and World Bank are intensilYing. to garner a
better sense of besl practices in legislative development. though those lessons have yel to
be shared more widely or publically.lO This has included. more recently. a programme to
conduct a StaffTraining Seminar with the UNDP. based on the Guidehook on
Strengthening Ihe Representative Capacity ufLegis/CJfltrrs. It Yet the guidebook is by
its own admission a practical guide. on strictly practical issues. l :
Unfortunately. larger questions exploring representation in transitional
parliaments. notions ofeffective representation or cvcn case studics of past programmcs
to develop more representativc parliaments are not examined. One document can not be
everything, but assumptions of what conslitulcS a good legislalure in a representati~'c
democracy need exploring, panicularly in new democracies where expectations (or
cap3cities) may dilTcr from western conceptions,
Notwithstanding the successes and progress in what is arguably a difficult
"For ella.mple, NDl's work is increasingl}" available on the intemet:1I URL: hnp:l/I\i\lw.acco:ss-
dcmocrac}".org.
IO"'UNDP Launches Initiatives on Good GovemJllce,- UN Win'. 19 July :WOO. NDllegislative
staff nonetheless described the allempt by the World Bank 10 develop a curriculum forlq:islative
development as a 'cookie<uner' approach. Conversation, NDI Staff. Washington, DC. April 2000
"National Democratic Institute fOl" Intcmalional Affairs. Guid~booJt. OIl Streng/h,ming /h~
Represe11l{1/i1:e Capocity alLegislalureS (Washington: National Democratic Institute for International
Development. October 200 I).
11 Ibid,p.3.4.
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domain. there remains· as the IiteralUrc and my experience suggest· room for
improvemenl. 'J Burnell begins his concluding article in Democracy Assis/ance:
In/emotional Co-opera/ionjar Democratiza/ion with the words "Ten or more years into
the flourishing of democracy assistance as a fashionable international art fonn. some
serious queSltonS need 10 be asked (emphasis added]:'" Recognizing and reflecting
on them will be the next important step in the 'industry:
Legislative development as conducted by NDI can be strengthened by a measured
consideration on three counts: systematic study. core strategy. and proper assessment.
My experience also suggests somcthing else: the academic literature does not appear off
the mark in its assessment. This gives hope that future study on related questions can be
accurate and bear impact on the conduct on legislative aid. and democracy aid in
general. 1l
While my work in Madagascar did not figure in this thesis. in some ways it
encompasses all of the criticisms [make above. [was offered a position in April 1996 to
execute a legislative strengthening programme there. I was hired for a number of
reasons. I had worked in the Canadian parliament for a few years as a legislative aid and
uCarothersnoleslhathiscriticlsmsofdemocracyaidareinlendedasconstruclivecrillcalinqull)'
and arc therefore ISSUCS fOf debale. not proofs of the futility of democracy aid . .~idi"g !kmQCrat)· .~broad.
p.60.
I~BullK'lI. -Slaleofthe AM:' p.JJ9.
IlThis IsnodoubllruebccatJSelhe literature abounds wilh rercrenccslothc "iorkofCarothel'Swho
IS the principal llSSCSsorofdemocracy assistancc lhus far. Carothers bascs hiscrillqucs CHl his own
experience working for numerous aid practilloners.
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therefore could be expected to know what a parliament 'is' or should De. [spoke French.
which NO! required to ....urk in the fonner French colony. I also had some leaching
experience. with English as a Second Language and lecluring first year political science.
Finally. r had organizational experience in polilics and campus ministry. required for
managing the logistics in organizing a parliamentary seminar or conference roundtable.
I did not. however. havc expericnce in transitional parliaments and had nt:ither
sludicd nor even read about their role and work in new democracies. a direct prerequisite
lor the job. 16 Many NDI staff have no such experience. untillhey are first hired by Ihe
Institute. I had never been to Madagascar. nor any other dcveloping country apart from
Guatemala whcre I had studied unrelated qucstions of religion. democracy and human
rights. But I did have. not unlike the Inslitute. assumptions about what a legislalure
should be. and was willing to work on that basis. I was hired. An newspaper article on
NDl's new representativc in Azerbaijan in 1999 noted he knew nOlhing of thai country's
politics or history.1l The same could have been said of me in Madagascar.
The Madagascar programme had been preceded by an NDlteam including staff.
a fonner legislator from a transitional legislature in Africa. and a fonner Canadian
parliamentary staffer then working for NDI. The survey mission visited Ihe country - .11
the invitation of USAID and the parliamentary speaker - in DecemDer 1995 to assess the
l"National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, Report oflhe,vOl Sun"")' Missiorr (0
Madagascor: Decefllbt!r J /I) 14. 1995 (Washington. D.C.: National Democratic Institute for International
Alfairs.I995).p.19.
17Geolfrey York, 'The Dream Merchants:' Globe und Mail. October 16. :!OOO.
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parliamen(s functioning and what NOI might do. II Meetings were conducted with
numerous parliamentary contacts such as party leaders. the speaker. and committee
chairs. in addition to US Mission statf(Embassy and USAIO) and other 'politicar actors
outside the parliament including journalists and NGO activists.l~ The programme
recommendation was a basic programme of democracy education. consisting of two
seminars on basic legislative themes. and a study tour to either South Africa or Namibia.
where NDI was already working..'O
This experience typifies the approach of aid practitioners. Various assumptions
undergirded the work: that the legislature was the appropriate national actor with which
to work. that il should behave like legislatures we 'knew' from our experiences. and that
we could actually assist it. NO! possessed no systematic or grounded knowledge of
Madagascar's challenges in democralizing. The assessment was limited in scope and
was based on a predelernllnation to work. with parliament. In fact. the legislative survey
or assessment mission - to detennine the content of a legislative aid programme· was
included in the project proposal written before the team went to Madagascar. Working
with the legislature was predetermined. That same proposal identified the primary
IIReport of/he ,1101 SUlVey Mi~ion fO Madogascar. p.l. Wllilc I would not 5uggcslll1oe sp<::lker
did not in point offa<:t invitc NOI in this instance. similar claims are made in most progrnmme proposals
and reporu. but are not always the case. NDrs fo[[ow-on in Morocco said il was a programme condOC!OO at
the rcqUC5t of the parliamcnl.. which was nOt the ea5C:. Tbe usual procedure Fordemocrocyassistanceis
USAIO decides to mai;e monies available. the inlermediary (such a NOll figures out what it might do. and
then me 10<:011 partner is asked if they want such a programme. The practitioners men make the claim matm:
programme is in respon.se to a request. Caromers. Aiding DemocraC)' Abroad pp.257·260.
19tbidp.l.
:!<llbid. p.2. This meant eithtr Soulh AtTica or Namibia.
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objective of the parliament 10 be increasing its effectiveness. tltrough the presentation of
international perspectives on legislative functions. including "questions relating to the
politic:> of how .1 legislature functions in a democratic political culture:'!)
Elements of the core strategy such as the Ameri-eentric legislative focus were
included in the programme. including emphasis on law-making and executive oversight.
very much in play in the US Congress but less evident in most parliaments. particularly
in those with poor resources.!: The second recommendation for a parliamentary
programme included a listing offunctions ofan MP that placed legislating lirst.!J On
completion of the programme. no post-assessment was conducted. and NDI conducted
no funher programmcs.: l
The work will always be a challenge. not just because of all the other competing
demands for development resources. though that too. Rather. ·... there is the contingenc)'
of democracy's progress on so many other variables. exogenous and domestic. structural
as well as hwnan agency· variables which for the most part lie beyond the potential
llNalional Democratic InSlitule fa.. [nlemational Affairs. ffi!mocratic CQll!io/idatio" ill
.tfadag<lScar: The Ro/e ojall Effecti\'e L"1Iislature: Proj«t Proposal. {Washington: Nalional Democratic
InstiluteforlntemationalAffairs.Decemberl9951.p.8
::Report ojfheNDI Sun"C'}''\/issilm to Madagascar. p.:!. The Survey Mission. while highlighting
fealUreS oflhe US Congressional model. did nOle tile neccssilY of including parliamentari:ms as trainers
from otlter parliamentary modds. p.19.
:JOemocralic CO'lSo/idorio" in Madagascar. p.17. For an addilional assessment oflhe political
situation in Madagascar before ND1's programme. see £",lIuation de la poIitique et de fa gouWrII<lnc.: J
Madagascar. (Washington: Associales for Rural Developmenl. April 19'N).
l"The National Cooncil oFSlate Legislature and Centre for Legislative De\'elopment at SUNY
conducted a provamme follow-on 10 NO!. Jeremy O. Meadows. Malagasy NO/iolla! AS5embly C"pacity
£nhancemell/: Final Ref1O'l (New York: State UniversilY of New York. at Albany. 1999). See also
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reach of democracy assistance_"!~ But ultimately. asking the right questions is as much ;)
part of the democracy aid practitioner"s arsenal as providing the appropriate answers.;·
Proper and careful response to the three criticisms raised in this thesis would be a partial
response to ensuring that legislative development meets the high goals it is premised
upon.
There remain important questions for future study. and a number of policy
recommltndations flow from the material I have covered. They can be summarized as
comprehensive analysis of current legislative democracy aid. undergirded by systematic
study on the role of legislatures in new democracies: the de\-e1opment ora set or
preconditions for legislath-e aid (which can be somewhat particular to each practitioner):
and a needs assessmcnt model for assessing how a particular legislatUfC might be
assisted. including some aJlo\\o"ance for revision once a programme is underway_
A need exists to undertake a comprehensive review of legislatures in transition.
including their roles and functions_ This could include a detailed consideration of
functioning legislatures - parliaments that are both central to national politics and have
capacity to be heard - in a series of new democracies in the consolidation or transition
phase. and also in smaller. consolidated democracies. such as Costa Rica. Additionally.
a detailed study of the aid to legislatures. and an atlempt to quantify and qualifY
legislative democracy aid, would be beneficial. What is it achieving? How is it
!'Sumdl.-·StalcoflhcArt: p.J50_
!6Ibid.p_.m.
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impacting legislatures? What are those legislatures then doing in the democratization
process of their respective countries? How should legislative aid be done. and what
should il entail? Building a comprehensive set ofindicalors of the effectiveness and
efficacy of transitionallegislalures and undertaking a comparalive study oflhcro would
go a long way to understanding and revealing the import, if any. oflegislatures in ncw
democracics.
That in lum will affect the conduct of democracy assistance to such legislatures.
The hope that this might be done is shared by those in leadership positions in such
organizations as NOI. The Institute's past vice-president. in a review ofa book on Arab
legislatures and ncw dcmocracics, expressed his hope that academics and practitioners
will"c;<amine the ways in which the myriad efforts to enhance Ihe rolc of legislatures in
democratizing countries do or don't aClually help..,:~
Aid practitioners have nOled positive developments in legislative performances
in new dcmocracies. bUI there is little syslematic analysis. Legislatures appear to be
more responsive 10 consli!uent needs. more likely to withstand executive dominance.
and more activist in conducting inquiries or voting against government bills.11 But more
!lMelia. Review. p.5. Praclitioner1 are not prone to ask questions of this nature. For example, on
r.-·ooccasions t""TOtccolieagucsworking .... ilh legislalures seeking examples ofstlccessesin legisrative
deve!opmenl lhat impacled posi!ively on democratic transilions and increased public confidence in them.
No one responded 10 the request. even after it was r~lded by Ihe Legislalive leam al NOI in Washinglon.
Me!iaasis:-Ooes the failure 10 consider these questions imply a recognilion thaI the workisoflimiled
valueT
1'Christopher Fomunyoh, "Democr.llizalion in FilS and Starn:' Journal ofDemocrucy 12. J
(200t). pp. ~S-l6. Fomunyoh. NOI's Cenlral. East & West Africa Regional Di~lor, also nOles the lension
belWeenlruedemocrnlizalionnndJiberalizarion,anolheris!tUeforfunhersludy.
-[15·
study is required: "little is known - allhough much is believed - about the impact of
democracy assistance on institutional development:'~
Finally. as Carothers notes. there is a need to examine more closely the question
of the origins of democracy aid. He suggests that it may be that democratization has
produced democracy aid. as opposed to the reverse.:.o Does it mailer: It docs if
practitioners are more focused and guided by the availability of money before
consideration of the work that might be valuable.
Any reconsideration must include a critical consideration of the transition
paradigm and core strateb')' implicitly held by aid practitioners. which assumes a
sequence of events in transitions which no longer hold. Revealing the underlying bias or
assumption is the question posed by most practitioners in a gi\'cn country: "How is the
democratic transition going?" That question should be. Carothers suggests. "What is
happening politically?" That would result in a more open-endl.:d and accurate analysis,"
In Yemen - and even more so in Morocco - it would have suggested things were not
going as NDI hoped.
The questions remain valuable. Democracy aid is a gro\\ing field. with voices in
Canada recently calling for the creation ofan NDI-type institute to do political
:!'ISaraJI Mendetson, "Ev3lu3ling lXmocrocy Assistance 10 Eastern Europe and Russia.- PONARS.
Flclcher$chool of law and Diplomacy. October 1999. p,l URL:
hnp:lf\\'\vw,csis,org!ruscunlipon;u;/policymcmosl pm_OOS7.pdf.
)(lCarothers. Aiding Dl1mlXTaC)' Abroad, p.+!.
J1Carothers. -The End oflhe Transition Paradigm: p.IS,
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development work abroad.)~ Any such. development must be executed in consideration
of the criticisms of democracy aid that do exist. Wilh respect to legislalive development
aid in particular. donors (and Canada if we join this growing field) should be encouraged
10 develop a more comprehensive model of legislalive assessment. The assessment
currently used by NDI is a set ofquestions on topics such as legislative constitutional
powers. structure and organization. the legislative process. commiltees. and legislator
profiles. Other questions concern the number of bills debated. amended and/or adopted
persession.H
Unfortunately. questions arc simply never answered before programme work
begins. or as in Yemen and Morocco. no assessment is conducted before programmes
arc approved. Other organizations possess their models of assessmenl. but they were not
used in NDrs work. There was neither an attempt to incorporate them into NDl's
assessments (when they were in fact done) or to gamer from them a fuller sense of
legislative assessment challenges. Questions related to the centrality and capacity of
legislatures are not often asked.J.I
Anolher important queslion is why is there such an abundant literature on
J:Jeffrey Simpson. "Time 10 go the e.ltr.1 mile for clemocr.lcy." Globe & Mail Wednesday. 28
November200I.p.AI9.
JJOUlHnejO' Base/ineAssessmefll. p.l.
J.lMelia. Review. p.5. Examples of other legislative alis<:ssmenllOO!s are III.., UNDP's Ho...· to
Conduct A Legisla/i.·1t Nl!f!ds ASSe5.1mefll. October 1999. URL:
http://magneurndp.orgldocsipariiamenlSlHoW'/020Io''/.20 conclu~"'20 needso/020assessmenl.lltm. and Hat
Lippman and Jan Emmert, Assisting Lqislatllro.
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American democracy and American foreign policy. and yet so little on American efforts
to promOie democracy?H American democracy promotion efforts both during and post-
Reagan were and remain far-reaching. Smith wonders how much democracy aid actually
stimulated the spread of democrocy.JI> That relates to the relationship ofdemocracy
assistance. democratization. and the availabiliry of democracy aid money noted above by
Carothers.
Democratic aid practitioners. particularly the US. ean not ultimately rewrite
'cultural stories or social h.istories. and legislatures are cenainly and appropriately
'independent' entities. Democracy aid may not even be a variable. so its rok should not
be exaggerated.n A deeper understanding of its impacts would reduce the risk of
exaggeration. and allow for appropriating of the sue~ses that are real. As NDI's
president noted in a re<:ent lecture. 'Democracy promotion is a cause-oriented activity... it
requires optimism and enthusiasm. II Matching that optimism and enthusiasm with a
deeper understanding on legislatures and legislative aid can only improve the efforts of
practitioners.
llSmith. America'J Minion. p.3-I6. Smith is particularly critical of American scholanhip in
ignoring this important question. particularly with m~t to a comparative fi'ame"'ork or to historical
depth. pp.J47-3-18. He proposes. on pp.J6S·367. three analytical tools for understanding and laking
seriously 'American ideal democrotic internationalism:
;tiSmith.America·sMiJJion.p.J()-I.
llSmith•.-1mericQ·sMiJsion.p.J+l.
llKenneth D. Wollack. Lecture Rema.rb. Cameige Intemational Endo"'mcnt for Peace.
Was/1inglOn. D.C.. II January 2000. URl: hnp:/lwww.ceip.org/fiIes/evenlSldemocrocy·paradigm.asp.
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